The pressure for lawful warrantless access to surveil internet subscriber data is long-standing and began in the late 1990s. But recently acquired access-to-information documents shed some light on some of the actors driving the push for more lawful access.

The Strong Borders Act, Bill C-2, introduced in June 2025, faced criticism about its proposed warrantless lawful access provisions that would make it easier for police and intelligence agencies to access Canadians’ internet data without judicial sign-off. Critics said that included access to medical, hotel and car rental, and many other personal records.

After backlash from civil society groups, Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree removed those provisions last October, and reintroduced much of the rest of Bill C-2 as Bill C-12, set to come up this session. 

But the minister also indicated that that he would be introducing a separate warrantless lawful access bill in 2026.

Bill C-2 would have allowed law and intelligence agencies to make information demands to a wide range of electronic service providers for general service data on specific internet subscribers, though seeking the actual content of those records would have required court authorization and oversight.

Tim McSorley of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group said he's concerned that "Bill C-2 would undermine more than a decade of Canadian privacy-related jurisprudence to enable a massive expansion of domestic surveillance. Without a warrant, police and spy agencies could demand information about our online activities based on the low threshold of 'reasonable suspicion.' ”

The pressure for lawful warrantless access to surveil internet-subscriber data is long-standing, and began in the late 1990s. It had been part of previous unsuccessful legislation attempts, reputedly, as a means of staying apace with the changing crime and national security landscape.

Recently acquired access-to-information documents shed some light on some of the actors driving the push for more lawful access. 

One set of records confirmed that CSIS was one key driving force behind then Bill C-2’s broad warrantless legal access lawful access provisions though many have believed the police were the main force behind this.

The records show how CSIS worked hand in hand with the RCMP, the Department of Justice, and the Privy Council Office to get such powers. 

CSIS indicated that if the RCMP would get this access to basic internet data through changes to the Criminal Code, so should they through amendments to the CSIS Act for national security purposes.

CSIS downplayed criticism that the new warrantless access powers in Bill C-2 are as sweeping as opponents claim as they already could get much data. 

Their talking points claim that there was no real change in Bill C-2 in CSIS's ability to collect information and the amendments to their act—just an effort at tidying up information demands within their existing mandate. 

The courts, they said, would still be involved in CSIS collection of more detailed personal data of targeted individuals. 

But the courts in recent times have reacted to lawful access overreach attempts by law and intelligence agencies as too invasive.

Nonetheless, CSIS, as reported in The Globe and Mail, greeted the warrantless information demand provisions embedded in the Strong Borders Act as “great news,” and their work on pressing from the inside for proposed warrantless access amendments as a “great job”.

What was unusual is that CSIS released such internal communications about their role in drafting the warrantless legal access provisions in Bill C-2. Though partly redacted, normally next to nothing would be disclosed, especially since many records were labelled as cabinet confidences and Canadian-eyes-only top secret. 

Another set of access-to-information documents obtained provides yet a further glimpse of behind-the-scenes discussions of those in policing and security, including CSIS, working with the private sector—on how to make lawful access procedures more effective and workable. 

The records are from the minutes of a little-known Lawful Access Advisory Committee whose members include the RCMP, CSIS, and provincial and local police forces, as well as major telecommunications and internet providers. There are no public, consumer, bar association or civil liberty representatives.

One matter that preoccupied them in the obtained 2024 and 2025 meetings was how to pay for lawful access work.

That included a discussion on funding models with the group expressing a preference for a centralized funding model administered by an unidentified governing body. This was necessary given the likely significant costs in the millions of dollars to re-engineer electronic service providers' platforms to allow CSIS and the police greater access to internet related information. 

They discussed seeking expedited purchase orders where needed, and going to the Public Safety minister to lobby for urgent funding and better lawful access.

The summary minutes also examined related matters like data cloud storage arrangements, vendor vetting, and better tracking information systems to make the lawful access system more operative. 

Rogers brought up having non-disclosure agreements about production orders to achieve the re-engineering.

The RCMP representative noted that changes would mean dealing with United States-Canada data sharing arrangements.   

One meeting-minute entry indicated they needed to address and face how organized criminal elements were getting into the act by using cell-site/stingray unauthorized technical access to personal data. 

Knowing that criminal organizations work across borders and online, the cooperation of the private sector was sought in dealing with this issue of illegal invasive access outside the legal channels.

So, away from the public eye, through such an advisory committee, police and intelligence agencies could privately discuss the technical cooperation they needed from the private communications sector to get more direct access to personal data held by these commercial third parties. The end goal they sought was to have more expansive internet surveillance access for suspected internet subscribers.

And the private sector communication providers were looking to their law enforcement/security partners for acceptable and better security standards. 

The lawful access advisory committee co-chairs are, on the government side, the RCMP, and either Rogers or Bell on the private sector side. The committee set up technical, operation and governance subcommittees tasked to come up with action plans. 

One thing revealed is that the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission—of all agencies—attended the meetings as observers. So did the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.

They were aware, too, that they had to consult privately with ATIP and privacy review officials, knowing their lawful access advisory committee—consisting of government-corporate partners—would face transparency and privacy issues. 

Having willing partners privately put together how a further/future lawful access system would operate—even before legislation is enacted—is controversial. 

But it sets the stage in which everyone has a stake for an upcoming renewed legislation battle—with powerful forces wanting to create the means for and finally wanting to win greater and easier legalized access to personal data.