>Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. Recently, Sadjadpour wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs, titled “Autumn of the Ayatollahs: What Kind of Change is Coming to Iran?” Diwan interviewed him in early November to discuss the essay, and more broadly to examine what the future holds for Iran.
>Michael Young: You’ve just written a very interesting essay for Foreign Affairs in which you examine the kind of changes that may be coming to Iran once the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, passes away. Before getting into the piece itself, what immediately hits the reader is that your conclusions are far different—I would say far more potentially pessimistic—than the usual assumptions in the West about what might happen in the country once the Islamic regime goes. To what extent were you motivated by a desire to push back against optimistic scenarios that seem to prevail?
>Karim Sadjadpour: My intention wasn’t to write optimistic or pessimistic scenarios, but realistic ones based on Iran’s unique history and political culture. In the aftermath of the Twelve-Day War—when Khamenei’s fate appeared uncertain—I was struck by the research of political scientist Barbara Geddes, which shows that from World War II to the present, less than a quarter of authoritarian transitions have led to democracy; far more often, they have led to another form of authoritarianism. Iran’s 1979 revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the outcome of uprisings in most Arab Spring countries are all examples of this. When authoritarian governments collapse as a result of internal violence or external conflict, the likelihood of a democratic transition is even lower.
>The question I wanted to probe was whether the Islamic Republic after Khamenei would endure, transform, or implode—and what kind of system would emerge in its wake. My own sense is that the status quo is not sustainable, yet if the regime were to implode anytime soon, the autocratic alternative would be better positioned to take power than the democratic alternative.
>As I wrote, Iran has all the makings of a G-20 country: an educated, globally connected population, tremendous natural resources, and a proud civilizational identity. For Iranian democrats, however, the international climate could hardly be less favorable. The United States and other Western governments that once championed democracy have withdrawn resources and are preoccupied with their own democratic backsliding. In this context, Iran is more likely to follow broader regional and global trends in which strongmen rise by stressing the virtues of order rather than the promise of freedom. There’s a light at the end of the tunnel, but for now, Iran’s democrats are still trying to build the tunnel.
>MY: What do you see as the possible futures for Iran once Khamenei, passes away?
>KS: What I tried to do was use a comparative framework to make these scenarios more accessible. I was inspired by an essay that the historian Stephen Kotkin wrote in Foreign Affairs titled “Russia’s Five Futures.” Iran will, of course, follow its own unique path, but these are the five trajectories I wrote about, in no particular order: First, Iran as Russia, where a nationalist strongman takes power. The regime collapses under the weight of sanctions, corruption, and social unrest, leaving a vacuum filled by security elites and oligarchs. Out of that turmoil could emerge an “Iranian Putin,” who replaces Islamism with grievance-driven nationalism.
>Second, an Iran as China scenario, characterized by pragmatic autocracy. Iran’s leaders attempt to preserve the system by shifting from revolutionary zeal to pragmatic national interest—opening the economy and seeking rapprochement with the United States. The regime remains repressive, but its legitimacy rests more on growth and nationalism than on ideology.
Third, an Iran as North Korea scenario, in which there is continuity in the clerical leadership. The state doubles down on ideology, isolation, and repression, perhaps under Khamenei’s son Mojtaba or another hardline cleric, sustained mainly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Survival depends on totalitarian control at home and a nuclear deterrent abroad.
>Fourth, an Iran as Pakistan scenario, defined by military dominance. The IRGC eclipses the clergy, ruling directly or indirectly as guardians of national unity. Iran becomes a praetorian state defined less by ideology than by generals, vacillating between confrontation and accommodation with the West.
Flashy_Upstairs9004 on
At this point a less islamist junta would be a massive improvement.
fuggitdude22 on
I’m not optimistic. Best case scenario is that the military establishment decides to transition into something more secular. The Baathist Regime in Iraq did not succumb under sanctions after Operation Desert Storm or Operation Desert Fox. There were mass armed uprisings and Kurdish Tribes were able to cement a strong-hold of Northern Iraq. A symmetrical situation unraveled in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance battling the Taliban, Dostum and Massoud were able to develop zones of control. In Iran, you have no armed or secular alternatives clawing any sphere of control, it is all just the Islamic Republic to my knowledge. Additionally, Reza Pahlavi is esteemed by predominately Persian Expats, I am unsure about the current residents’ thoughts on him. He hasn’t held a job in his entire adult life or really echoed anything insightful via writing like Lenin or Ho Chi Minh. Also, it is important to underscore that only 60% of Iran is Persian, Kurds and Bahais loathed his father’s regime as it is. Azeris are probably more mixed, some may have more secessionist claims.
DizzySleep1 on
In my mind iran is like turkey that had a much worse 20th century.
4 Comments
>Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. Recently, Sadjadpour wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs, titled “Autumn of the Ayatollahs: What Kind of Change is Coming to Iran?” Diwan interviewed him in early November to discuss the essay, and more broadly to examine what the future holds for Iran.
>Michael Young: You’ve just written a very interesting essay for Foreign Affairs in which you examine the kind of changes that may be coming to Iran once the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, passes away. Before getting into the piece itself, what immediately hits the reader is that your conclusions are far different—I would say far more potentially pessimistic—than the usual assumptions in the West about what might happen in the country once the Islamic regime goes. To what extent were you motivated by a desire to push back against optimistic scenarios that seem to prevail?
>Karim Sadjadpour: My intention wasn’t to write optimistic or pessimistic scenarios, but realistic ones based on Iran’s unique history and political culture. In the aftermath of the Twelve-Day War—when Khamenei’s fate appeared uncertain—I was struck by the research of political scientist Barbara Geddes, which shows that from World War II to the present, less than a quarter of authoritarian transitions have led to democracy; far more often, they have led to another form of authoritarianism. Iran’s 1979 revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the outcome of uprisings in most Arab Spring countries are all examples of this. When authoritarian governments collapse as a result of internal violence or external conflict, the likelihood of a democratic transition is even lower.
>The question I wanted to probe was whether the Islamic Republic after Khamenei would endure, transform, or implode—and what kind of system would emerge in its wake. My own sense is that the status quo is not sustainable, yet if the regime were to implode anytime soon, the autocratic alternative would be better positioned to take power than the democratic alternative.
>As I wrote, Iran has all the makings of a G-20 country: an educated, globally connected population, tremendous natural resources, and a proud civilizational identity. For Iranian democrats, however, the international climate could hardly be less favorable. The United States and other Western governments that once championed democracy have withdrawn resources and are preoccupied with their own democratic backsliding. In this context, Iran is more likely to follow broader regional and global trends in which strongmen rise by stressing the virtues of order rather than the promise of freedom. There’s a light at the end of the tunnel, but for now, Iran’s democrats are still trying to build the tunnel.
>MY: What do you see as the possible futures for Iran once Khamenei, passes away?
>KS: What I tried to do was use a comparative framework to make these scenarios more accessible. I was inspired by an essay that the historian Stephen Kotkin wrote in Foreign Affairs titled “Russia’s Five Futures.” Iran will, of course, follow its own unique path, but these are the five trajectories I wrote about, in no particular order: First, Iran as Russia, where a nationalist strongman takes power. The regime collapses under the weight of sanctions, corruption, and social unrest, leaving a vacuum filled by security elites and oligarchs. Out of that turmoil could emerge an “Iranian Putin,” who replaces Islamism with grievance-driven nationalism.
>Second, an Iran as China scenario, characterized by pragmatic autocracy. Iran’s leaders attempt to preserve the system by shifting from revolutionary zeal to pragmatic national interest—opening the economy and seeking rapprochement with the United States. The regime remains repressive, but its legitimacy rests more on growth and nationalism than on ideology.
Third, an Iran as North Korea scenario, in which there is continuity in the clerical leadership. The state doubles down on ideology, isolation, and repression, perhaps under Khamenei’s son Mojtaba or another hardline cleric, sustained mainly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Survival depends on totalitarian control at home and a nuclear deterrent abroad.
>Fourth, an Iran as Pakistan scenario, defined by military dominance. The IRGC eclipses the clergy, ruling directly or indirectly as guardians of national unity. Iran becomes a praetorian state defined less by ideology than by generals, vacillating between confrontation and accommodation with the West.
At this point a less islamist junta would be a massive improvement.
I’m not optimistic. Best case scenario is that the military establishment decides to transition into something more secular. The Baathist Regime in Iraq did not succumb under sanctions after Operation Desert Storm or Operation Desert Fox. There were mass armed uprisings and Kurdish Tribes were able to cement a strong-hold of Northern Iraq. A symmetrical situation unraveled in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance battling the Taliban, Dostum and Massoud were able to develop zones of control. In Iran, you have no armed or secular alternatives clawing any sphere of control, it is all just the Islamic Republic to my knowledge. Additionally, Reza Pahlavi is esteemed by predominately Persian Expats, I am unsure about the current residents’ thoughts on him. He hasn’t held a job in his entire adult life or really echoed anything insightful via writing like Lenin or Ho Chi Minh. Also, it is important to underscore that only 60% of Iran is Persian, Kurds and Bahais loathed his father’s regime as it is. Azeris are probably more mixed, some may have more secessionist claims.
In my mind iran is like turkey that had a much worse 20th century.