Again, before I get criticism about posting an article from South China Morning Post: The author of this article in question is Finbarr Bermingham, who is an Irish journalist based on Brussels that writes articles in SCMP mainly from the EU point of view. As such, I believe that his articles can be considered to be of good enough objectivity and credibility to be posted here.
The EU is greatly struggling to derisk from China. There are hostile US to EU actions, such as Liberation Day tariffs, the new 301 investigations, and general fickleness of the Trump administrations foreign policy that demand the EU’s attention immediately, which in turn reduces capacity for separating critical industrial chains from China. Other situations have also distracted the EU, such as the war in Iran, the war in Gaza, and the war in Ukraine.
Despite the existentiality of making sure its industries remain competitive with Chinese industries, the EU has continually moved China down as a priority because of these events. EU leaders simply do not have the capacity to work through all these problems, with juggling trade deals, industrial reshoring, and countering hostile threats all at the same time.
I’m not familiar with how the EU organizes itself, so I’m just taking the author’s word and have no particular opinion on the byzantine (or not) nature of the EU. Many governments are having trouble navigating this period. I will say though, a lot of the waffling does seem familiar to me as someone who occasionally observes EU action, wherein ministers and diplomats will say the right things but fail to follow up with action.
You can see this overloading of capacity and the subsequent lack of action and initiative in the contrast between Starmer’s visit to China versus Merz and Macron. Consistent with the theme of the article, given the other issues they were juggling, they didn’t secure many diplomatic victories or deals, apart from one headline-grabbing confirmation from China to purchase 120 Airbus planes. But Starmer, given that the UK doesn’t have to worry much about the internal affairs of the EU nowadays because of Brexit, was able to secure multiple investment and cooperation agreements between Chinese and British companies.
I also think this is another way that the US is sabotaging its allies – by continually creating these short and medium term crises, it forces them to direct time and energy away from long-horizon concerns, such as the possibility of losing its industry to China.
1 Comment
Again, before I get criticism about posting an article from South China Morning Post: The author of this article in question is Finbarr Bermingham, who is an Irish journalist based on Brussels that writes articles in SCMP mainly from the EU point of view. As such, I believe that his articles can be considered to be of good enough objectivity and credibility to be posted here.
The EU is greatly struggling to derisk from China. There are hostile US to EU actions, such as Liberation Day tariffs, the new 301 investigations, and general fickleness of the Trump administrations foreign policy that demand the EU’s attention immediately, which in turn reduces capacity for separating critical industrial chains from China. Other situations have also distracted the EU, such as the war in Iran, the war in Gaza, and the war in Ukraine.
Despite the existentiality of making sure its industries remain competitive with Chinese industries, the EU has continually moved China down as a priority because of these events. EU leaders simply do not have the capacity to work through all these problems, with juggling trade deals, industrial reshoring, and countering hostile threats all at the same time.
I’m not familiar with how the EU organizes itself, so I’m just taking the author’s word and have no particular opinion on the byzantine (or not) nature of the EU. Many governments are having trouble navigating this period. I will say though, a lot of the waffling does seem familiar to me as someone who occasionally observes EU action, wherein ministers and diplomats will say the right things but fail to follow up with action.
You can see this overloading of capacity and the subsequent lack of action and initiative in the contrast between Starmer’s visit to China versus Merz and Macron. Consistent with the theme of the article, given the other issues they were juggling, they didn’t secure many diplomatic victories or deals, apart from one headline-grabbing confirmation from China to purchase 120 Airbus planes. But Starmer, given that the UK doesn’t have to worry much about the internal affairs of the EU nowadays because of Brexit, was able to secure multiple investment and cooperation agreements between Chinese and British companies.
I also think this is another way that the US is sabotaging its allies – by continually creating these short and medium term crises, it forces them to direct time and energy away from long-horizon concerns, such as the possibility of losing its industry to China.
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