>The US and Iran are sliding back into war. This is not because either country has misunderstood the terms of the memorandum of understanding they signed to end the first phase of the conflict. The MoU was vague and open to misinterpretation, but its main fault was that it was premised on maintaining the balance of power at the moment of its signing — a balance that Washington was determined to alter, and Tehran to protect.
>The US started the war in February with the goal of toppling the Islamic republic or, barring that, to force it to accept an American diktat constraining its nuclear programme and regional role. Instead, the war handed Iran a strategic victory: control over the Strait of Hormuz — a setback that compelled the US to agree to the MoU.
>Iran’s leaders suspected that the MoU was a temporary retreat by the US, intended to relieve pressure on the global economy and prepare for another round of war. US vice-president JD Vance even suggested publicly that President Donald Trump liked the agreement because it would give America time to replenish its dwindling strategic oil reserves.
>They saw plenty of evidence to support their suspicions. There was no unfreezing of Iranian assets; a US-brokered deal between Israel and Lebanon disregarded Iran’s demands for ceasefire there; more US military assets began to arrive in the Gulf region; and Washington encouraged commercial vessels to disregard Tehran’s instructions to co-ordinate with its authorities and navigate through Iranian channels as they transited the Strait of Hormuz. Some ships then passed through channels close to the Omani shoreline instead. Washington expected that this would weaken Iran’s claim of control of the strait and ability to enforce it.
>Each of these on its own may not have been major violations of the MoU, but together they represented a concerted effort to erode the leverage Iran had gained during the war and reflected in the ceasefire agreement.
>Iran’s current rulers believe that any display of restraint will only invite further American pressure. To deter the US, and to compel it to negotiate in earnest for an end to the war and a broader nuclear deal that would give Tehran the security and economic relief it craves, they believe Iran has to be aggressive and escalate the conflict beyond what the US is prepared to countenance.
>The one point of leverage Iran is not prepared to part with is its claim to the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to control access to it. Losing dominance in the strait would leave Iran without any leverage in future negotiations. Iran’s leaders have decided that retaining control of the strait is essential to securing future wins at the negotiating table and ensuring that the US implements the deal rather than walking away from it.
>Last week’s mammoth turnout for the funeral of the slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei was also important in convincing Iran’s leaders that the population would support a hard stance on the strait, which has become a popular nationalist cause. It was in this context that Iran decided to thwart US plans to open the strait by attacking two tankers sailing close to the Omani coast. That show of force provoked a deliberately massive US response: an extended bombing campaign to destroy Iran’s drone and missile batteries along the Gulf coast and military and civilian infrastructure across the country, to raise the cost of resistance.
>But Iran had been expecting war. It may have resumed sooner than anticipated, but Tehran sees advantage in that: if war is inevitable, Iran is better off waging it before the US has had time to regroup fully, and the global economy has had time to recover from energy and supply chain shocks.
>Iran will therefore seek to absorb US military pressure and intensify its attacks on US military targets and energy and civilian infrastructure across the Gulf. Its aim is to signal that the war will not remain at the level of Washington’s choosing. In the meantime, Tehran will accept the inevitable economic hardship that another US naval blockade will entail, believing that its own pressure on the global economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz — and potentially the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea — will force Trump to blink first.
>Iran’s leaders might be overestimating their ability to pursue this strategy, but they believe that their willingness to escalate served the country well in the first phase of the conflict and that war may be the only way to convince Trump to take diplomacy seriously.
>The Iranian regime is engaged in an existential battle. It is betting that its willingness to endure greater pain gives it an advantage, which will stand it in good stead at a future negotiating table.
1 Comment
>The US and Iran are sliding back into war. This is not because either country has misunderstood the terms of the memorandum of understanding they signed to end the first phase of the conflict. The MoU was vague and open to misinterpretation, but its main fault was that it was premised on maintaining the balance of power at the moment of its signing — a balance that Washington was determined to alter, and Tehran to protect.
>The US started the war in February with the goal of toppling the Islamic republic or, barring that, to force it to accept an American diktat constraining its nuclear programme and regional role. Instead, the war handed Iran a strategic victory: control over the Strait of Hormuz — a setback that compelled the US to agree to the MoU.
>Iran’s leaders suspected that the MoU was a temporary retreat by the US, intended to relieve pressure on the global economy and prepare for another round of war. US vice-president JD Vance even suggested publicly that President Donald Trump liked the agreement because it would give America time to replenish its dwindling strategic oil reserves.
>They saw plenty of evidence to support their suspicions. There was no unfreezing of Iranian assets; a US-brokered deal between Israel and Lebanon disregarded Iran’s demands for ceasefire there; more US military assets began to arrive in the Gulf region; and Washington encouraged commercial vessels to disregard Tehran’s instructions to co-ordinate with its authorities and navigate through Iranian channels as they transited the Strait of Hormuz. Some ships then passed through channels close to the Omani shoreline instead. Washington expected that this would weaken Iran’s claim of control of the strait and ability to enforce it.
>Each of these on its own may not have been major violations of the MoU, but together they represented a concerted effort to erode the leverage Iran had gained during the war and reflected in the ceasefire agreement.
>Iran’s current rulers believe that any display of restraint will only invite further American pressure. To deter the US, and to compel it to negotiate in earnest for an end to the war and a broader nuclear deal that would give Tehran the security and economic relief it craves, they believe Iran has to be aggressive and escalate the conflict beyond what the US is prepared to countenance.
>The one point of leverage Iran is not prepared to part with is its claim to the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to control access to it. Losing dominance in the strait would leave Iran without any leverage in future negotiations. Iran’s leaders have decided that retaining control of the strait is essential to securing future wins at the negotiating table and ensuring that the US implements the deal rather than walking away from it.
>Last week’s mammoth turnout for the funeral of the slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei was also important in convincing Iran’s leaders that the population would support a hard stance on the strait, which has become a popular nationalist cause. It was in this context that Iran decided to thwart US plans to open the strait by attacking two tankers sailing close to the Omani coast. That show of force provoked a deliberately massive US response: an extended bombing campaign to destroy Iran’s drone and missile batteries along the Gulf coast and military and civilian infrastructure across the country, to raise the cost of resistance.
>But Iran had been expecting war. It may have resumed sooner than anticipated, but Tehran sees advantage in that: if war is inevitable, Iran is better off waging it before the US has had time to regroup fully, and the global economy has had time to recover from energy and supply chain shocks.
>Iran will therefore seek to absorb US military pressure and intensify its attacks on US military targets and energy and civilian infrastructure across the Gulf. Its aim is to signal that the war will not remain at the level of Washington’s choosing. In the meantime, Tehran will accept the inevitable economic hardship that another US naval blockade will entail, believing that its own pressure on the global economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz — and potentially the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea — will force Trump to blink first.
>Iran’s leaders might be overestimating their ability to pursue this strategy, but they believe that their willingness to escalate served the country well in the first phase of the conflict and that war may be the only way to convince Trump to take diplomacy seriously.
>The Iranian regime is engaged in an existential battle. It is betting that its willingness to endure greater pain gives it an advantage, which will stand it in good stead at a future negotiating table.