Both “it’s Afghans’ fault for not fighting for their country” because the Afghan government couldn’t grow legitimate military forces and fell back to brutal warlords to serve as militias at the beginning.
And “it’s America’s fault for not setting up Afghan militias to succeed” for failing to find willing Afghan conscripts and falling back to warlords instead. These warlords gained the monopoly of force in their regions and later when the Americans told Afghanistan to run its own military affairs, they ended up just funneling American money and arms to the warlords. They didn’t really have a choice—they couldn’t afford the warlords turning against them.
As soon as the Americans pulled out the bribes for warlords’ militias ran out and the warlords vanished.
Looks like the warlords vanished faster than my last relationship.
bigwang123 on
Aligns with what I remember from the SIGAR reports
There was no consistent objective for what the ANP/ANA/ANSDF would ultimately look like. Efforts sought to form auxiliaries made of local militias, then create heavy mechanized/motorized forces under central government control, then light forces that were easier to equip, sometimes trying to achieve these goals simultaneously. The effect of these disjointed, under-resourced, short-lived, projects is exactly what was described by this article, with catastrophic results once the US withdrew.
The only bright spot in the whole project, it seems, were the Afghan Commandos, who became the only reliable force that the Republic had in its final days.
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So it turns out both sides are right.
Both “it’s Afghans’ fault for not fighting for their country” because the Afghan government couldn’t grow legitimate military forces and fell back to brutal warlords to serve as militias at the beginning.
And “it’s America’s fault for not setting up Afghan militias to succeed” for failing to find willing Afghan conscripts and falling back to warlords instead. These warlords gained the monopoly of force in their regions and later when the Americans told Afghanistan to run its own military affairs, they ended up just funneling American money and arms to the warlords. They didn’t really have a choice—they couldn’t afford the warlords turning against them.
As soon as the Americans pulled out the bribes for warlords’ militias ran out and the warlords vanished.
Already posted
https://old.reddit.com/r/neoliberal/comments/1hlgmif/behind_afghanistans_fall_usbacked_militias_worse/?ref=share&ref_source=link
Looks like the warlords vanished faster than my last relationship.
Aligns with what I remember from the SIGAR reports
There was no consistent objective for what the ANP/ANA/ANSDF would ultimately look like. Efforts sought to form auxiliaries made of local militias, then create heavy mechanized/motorized forces under central government control, then light forces that were easier to equip, sometimes trying to achieve these goals simultaneously. The effect of these disjointed, under-resourced, short-lived, projects is exactly what was described by this article, with catastrophic results once the US withdrew.
The only bright spot in the whole project, it seems, were the Afghan Commandos, who became the only reliable force that the Republic had in its final days.