My [last piece](https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-future-of-warfare-is-remote-controlled) for *Persuasion* argued that large numbers of small, autonomous platforms—airborne and naval drones—would become an increasingly large part of 21^(st) century warfare, and that their spread would be blocked by our current addiction to large, complex, expensive platforms like aircraft carriers, F-35 fighters, and Abrams tanks. This addiction is part of a much larger problem, which is the way that U.S. government agencies buy hi-tech products in general. Our difficulties buying technology is related to the other problem I’ve written extensively about, which is our [failure to build infrastructure](https://www.persuasion.community/p/building-things).
Government agencies procure software in the same way that the Air Force buys fighter jets. A government office starts drafting a “request for proposal” (RFP) to build a new product. This RFP is then sent around to interested agencies for comment, and it is here that the first big problem occurs. The list of requirements multiplies like rabbits, with each unit adding its priorities to the list. Those requirements may be individually justified, but there is generally no lead authority to set priorities and knock requirements off the list in the interest of cost or effectiveness. Oftentimes, the requirements are driven by a particular interest group with friends in Congress who make sure that their pet issue is covered.
This gold-plating problem has been recognized for years in defense procurement. The F-16 fighter, which over the decades has proven to be one of the most useful aircraft in the inventories of many countries, was initially sidelined because it was too simple. The Navy didn’t like the fact that it had only one engine, and the Air Force wanted a larger, heavier airframe for the range of roles it envisioned. It required special lobbying by General Chuck Boyd and his “fight Mafia” to convince Congress to support a lightweight plane like the F-16.
Something similar happens when civilian agencies procure software. They act as if they are buying a single big product that will be good for at least the next decade or two. The list of requirements grows into a large, complex contract. The actual RFP and bidding process are regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations, a document spanning hundreds of pages of detailed requirements that mandate things like seeking bids from female- and minority-owned businesses and the like. The contractor finally selected is empowered in turn to produce the product with relatively little ongoing input from the procuring agency, and the software package is delivered after a lot of time has passed.
The problem with this approach is of course that technology moves way too fast, and many of the original requirements are already outdated by the time the product is delivered. Moreover, the contractor focuses on fulfilling the contract rather than interacting with eventual users to modify requirements on the fly. Government agencies that have bought big software packages under the old procurement model have run into huge problems. These include the FBI, the IRS, the State Department, and of course the biggest debacle of the past generation, the Department of Health and Human Services procurement of [healthcare.gov](http://healthcare.gov) under Obamacare.
SouthernSerf on
> This gold-plating problem has been recognized for years in defense procurement. The F-16 fighter, which over the decades has proven to be one of the most useful aircraft in the inventories of many countries, was initially sidelined because it was too simple. The Navy didn’t like the fact that it had only one engine, and the Air Force wanted a larger, heavier airframe for the range of roles it envisioned. It required special lobbying by General Chuck Boyd and his “fight Mafia” to convince Congress to support a lightweight plane like the F-16.
> The Defense Department and the Armed Services need to change their procurement model as well and move away from thinking about big once-in-a-decade or once-in-a-generation technology acquisitions. If the U.S. military is going to move towards small, inexpensive autonomous weapons, it needs to open up the bidding process to the thousands of startups that can contribute. It needs to behave more like the Ukrainians. The latter have developed a domestic drone industry on the basis of continuous feedback between operators in the field and the people who write the software and design the platforms. In the current war with Russia, software gets updated every few days, or sometimes within hours of an engagement
Francis Fukuyama needs to stay in his lane, because this is a ignorant sophomoric take clearly written by some incapable of seeing past the current moment or seeing contextual operations.
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My [last piece](https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-future-of-warfare-is-remote-controlled) for *Persuasion* argued that large numbers of small, autonomous platforms—airborne and naval drones—would become an increasingly large part of 21^(st) century warfare, and that their spread would be blocked by our current addiction to large, complex, expensive platforms like aircraft carriers, F-35 fighters, and Abrams tanks. This addiction is part of a much larger problem, which is the way that U.S. government agencies buy hi-tech products in general. Our difficulties buying technology is related to the other problem I’ve written extensively about, which is our [failure to build infrastructure](https://www.persuasion.community/p/building-things).
Government agencies procure software in the same way that the Air Force buys fighter jets. A government office starts drafting a “request for proposal” (RFP) to build a new product. This RFP is then sent around to interested agencies for comment, and it is here that the first big problem occurs. The list of requirements multiplies like rabbits, with each unit adding its priorities to the list. Those requirements may be individually justified, but there is generally no lead authority to set priorities and knock requirements off the list in the interest of cost or effectiveness. Oftentimes, the requirements are driven by a particular interest group with friends in Congress who make sure that their pet issue is covered.
This gold-plating problem has been recognized for years in defense procurement. The F-16 fighter, which over the decades has proven to be one of the most useful aircraft in the inventories of many countries, was initially sidelined because it was too simple. The Navy didn’t like the fact that it had only one engine, and the Air Force wanted a larger, heavier airframe for the range of roles it envisioned. It required special lobbying by General Chuck Boyd and his “fight Mafia” to convince Congress to support a lightweight plane like the F-16.
Something similar happens when civilian agencies procure software. They act as if they are buying a single big product that will be good for at least the next decade or two. The list of requirements grows into a large, complex contract. The actual RFP and bidding process are regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations, a document spanning hundreds of pages of detailed requirements that mandate things like seeking bids from female- and minority-owned businesses and the like. The contractor finally selected is empowered in turn to produce the product with relatively little ongoing input from the procuring agency, and the software package is delivered after a lot of time has passed.
The problem with this approach is of course that technology moves way too fast, and many of the original requirements are already outdated by the time the product is delivered. Moreover, the contractor focuses on fulfilling the contract rather than interacting with eventual users to modify requirements on the fly. Government agencies that have bought big software packages under the old procurement model have run into huge problems. These include the FBI, the IRS, the State Department, and of course the biggest debacle of the past generation, the Department of Health and Human Services procurement of [healthcare.gov](http://healthcare.gov) under Obamacare.
> This gold-plating problem has been recognized for years in defense procurement. The F-16 fighter, which over the decades has proven to be one of the most useful aircraft in the inventories of many countries, was initially sidelined because it was too simple. The Navy didn’t like the fact that it had only one engine, and the Air Force wanted a larger, heavier airframe for the range of roles it envisioned. It required special lobbying by General Chuck Boyd and his “fight Mafia” to convince Congress to support a lightweight plane like the F-16.
> The Defense Department and the Armed Services need to change their procurement model as well and move away from thinking about big once-in-a-decade or once-in-a-generation technology acquisitions. If the U.S. military is going to move towards small, inexpensive autonomous weapons, it needs to open up the bidding process to the thousands of startups that can contribute. It needs to behave more like the Ukrainians. The latter have developed a domestic drone industry on the basis of continuous feedback between operators in the field and the people who write the software and design the platforms. In the current war with Russia, software gets updated every few days, or sometimes within hours of an engagement
Francis Fukuyama needs to stay in his lane, because this is a ignorant sophomoric take clearly written by some incapable of seeing past the current moment or seeing contextual operations.