There is a blatant incoherence at the heart of Donald Trump’s European agenda. On the one hand, the president is visibly exasperated with America’s European allies, in particular with their low defense spending and trade surpluses. On the other hand, in his forays into European politics, he tends to lend support to some of the least constructive political actors on the continent, who are oftentimes aligned with our adversaries.
First and foremost, consider the “[fantastic](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/08/politics/trump-orban-mar-a-lago/index.html)” Viktor Orbán, a perennial favorite of the president and a frequent guest to Mar-a-Lago. Thanks to the purchasing of some big-ticket items, including tanks, helicopters, and air defense systems, Hungary’s defense spending is expected to be 2.11% of GDP this year, after decades of underinvestment – a far cry from Polish or Baltic levels. But even this modest increase is not taking place without considerable grumbling. “If the 2% has to be increased,” Orbán said late last year, “that would shoot the Hungarian economy in the lungs.”
Of course, Orbán has also turned his country into a “pillar” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). He prevented the extradition of Russian criminals, the Lyubishins, wanted by U.S. authorities during the first Trump administration. And his government has made no apology for its outreach to the mullahs of Tehran, seeking to deepen trade and investment links with the regime, and hosting a 2000-strong student population from Iran.
The president’s confidant, Elon Musk, meanwhile spoke at the election campaign launch of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The party, with its long track record of pro-Russian rhetoric, may not oppose increasing defense spending to strengthen Germany’s defenses. AfD’s manifesto, however, dryly notes that “the interests of the USA diverge increasingly from those of Germany.”
In her effort at broadening her party’s appeal, the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, may have tried to deemphasize the party’s most toxic elements—but those are not non-existent. Maximilian Krah, an AfD Member of the European Parliament, gained notoriety for stating he would “never say that anyone who wore an SS uniform was automatically a criminal.” He also believes “the anti-China forces in Germany do not represent the interests of Germany,” and that decoupling from China would serve “the interests of America.”
By contrast, Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni—“[a fantastic woman](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/05/europe/trump-italian-pm-meloni-mar-a-lago-intl/index.html),” who attended President Trump’s inauguration—deserves credit for her clear pro-Ukrainian views, as well as for withdrawing Italy from BRI. However, she is not spending massive amounts of political capital to increase Italy’s defense spending, currently at 1.49%, nor does she have much fiscal space to do so against the background of a heavily indebted, sluggish economy. Meloni’s turn away from China leaves a lot to be desired, too, as illustrated by her trip to Beijing last year, followed by one by Italy’s president Sergio Mattarella, who called for more Chinese investment in Italy.
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There is a blatant incoherence at the heart of Donald Trump’s European agenda. On the one hand, the president is visibly exasperated with America’s European allies, in particular with their low defense spending and trade surpluses. On the other hand, in his forays into European politics, he tends to lend support to some of the least constructive political actors on the continent, who are oftentimes aligned with our adversaries.
First and foremost, consider the “[fantastic](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/08/politics/trump-orban-mar-a-lago/index.html)” Viktor Orbán, a perennial favorite of the president and a frequent guest to Mar-a-Lago. Thanks to the purchasing of some big-ticket items, including tanks, helicopters, and air defense systems, Hungary’s defense spending is expected to be 2.11% of GDP this year, after decades of underinvestment – a far cry from Polish or Baltic levels. But even this modest increase is not taking place without considerable grumbling. “If the 2% has to be increased,” Orbán said late last year, “that would shoot the Hungarian economy in the lungs.”
Of course, Orbán has also turned his country into a “pillar” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). He prevented the extradition of Russian criminals, the Lyubishins, wanted by U.S. authorities during the first Trump administration. And his government has made no apology for its outreach to the mullahs of Tehran, seeking to deepen trade and investment links with the regime, and hosting a 2000-strong student population from Iran.
The president’s confidant, Elon Musk, meanwhile spoke at the election campaign launch of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The party, with its long track record of pro-Russian rhetoric, may not oppose increasing defense spending to strengthen Germany’s defenses. AfD’s manifesto, however, dryly notes that “the interests of the USA diverge increasingly from those of Germany.”
In her effort at broadening her party’s appeal, the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, may have tried to deemphasize the party’s most toxic elements—but those are not non-existent. Maximilian Krah, an AfD Member of the European Parliament, gained notoriety for stating he would “never say that anyone who wore an SS uniform was automatically a criminal.” He also believes “the anti-China forces in Germany do not represent the interests of Germany,” and that decoupling from China would serve “the interests of America.”
By contrast, Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni—“[a fantastic woman](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/05/europe/trump-italian-pm-meloni-mar-a-lago-intl/index.html),” who attended President Trump’s inauguration—deserves credit for her clear pro-Ukrainian views, as well as for withdrawing Italy from BRI. However, she is not spending massive amounts of political capital to increase Italy’s defense spending, currently at 1.49%, nor does she have much fiscal space to do so against the background of a heavily indebted, sluggish economy. Meloni’s turn away from China leaves a lot to be desired, too, as illustrated by her trip to Beijing last year, followed by one by Italy’s president Sergio Mattarella, who called for more Chinese investment in Italy.