>The Chinese government has revolutionized digital repression at home and is exporting its technologies abroad. These transfers have sparked widespread concern among observers. These tools of digital dictatorship, many argue, will let recipient governments expand surveillance and reinforce the wave of autocratic retrenchment and democratic erosion currently underway. This article presents the first cross-country, plausibly causal evidence that these concerns are justified, but adds nuance.
>Huawei transfers are driven chiefly by demand in recipient countries. More populous countries represent more attractive markets for Huawei, while less affluent countries are more likely to be attracted by its lower price point. Huawei transfers are also more likely if the recipient government has a preexisting relationship with Beijing. The effects of these transfers, we find, depend on political institutions in recipient countries. In autocracies, where the chief political threat to incumbents is collective action by citizens and institutional oversight is weak, Huawei transfers lead to an expansion of digital surveillance, internet shutdowns, internet filtering, and targeted arrests for online content. In democracies, where governments have stronger incentivizes to provide public goods, institutional oversight is stronger, and civil societies are more vibrant, Huawei transfers have no clear or consistent effect on digital repression.
>Our empirical analysis has three limitations, which constitute important directions for future research. First, since digital repression is concealed and hence intrinsically difficult to measure, we use the V-Dem project’s expert-coded indices. Although the indices permit broad comparisons across regime types – our results suggest that Huawei transfers generate an increase in digital repression of between 10% and 25% of the difference in means between autocracies and democracies – we are unable to be more specific. Given the rise of digital repression across the world, we view better cross-national data as key. Second, since Huawei is secretive about its contracts, our statistical estimates may be subject to measurement error. Huawei contracts, like other Chinese infrastructure contracts, routinely include confidentiality clauses (Gelpern et al. [Reference Gelpern, Horn, Morris, Parks and Trebesch2022](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/exporting-the-tools-of-dictatorship-the-politics-of-chinas-technology-transfers/D1A5B1D7C7A21FB5E601A553E6E8833F#r49); Walker [Reference Walker2023](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/exporting-the-tools-of-dictatorship-the-politics-of-chinas-technology-transfers/D1A5B1D7C7A21FB5E601A553E6E8833F#r93)), which prohibit recipient governments from divulging information about them. Consequently, our record of Huawei transfers may be incomplete, which would effectively include some treated countries in the control group. Since this would bias against our key results, our statistical estimates should be regarded as lower bounds, with the actual effect potentially larger. Third, Huawei’s secrecy means that we also lack fine-grained data about what its transfers entail. Consequently, we cannot ascertain whether certain provisions within contracts are more likely to facilitate digital repression than others. This is almost certainly the case. Transfers that entail “Safe City” infrastructure, for instance, are almost certainly more likely to facilitate digital repression than contracts that focus on IT training for university students. Likewise, Huawei may be inclined to provide some recipient governments more direct personnel support than others, helping them overcome state capacity limitations that might otherwise prevent them from using technology transfers for digital repression. In this article, we use the value of the transfer as a proxy for its substance. This, we believe, makes sense. More expensive contracts are more likely to entail sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure and direct personnel support than less valuable contracts. With more fine-grained contract data, however, policymakers could construct early-warning systems that would identify the transfers most at-risk for human rights violations in recipient countries.
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>The Chinese government has revolutionized digital repression at home and is exporting its technologies abroad. These transfers have sparked widespread concern among observers. These tools of digital dictatorship, many argue, will let recipient governments expand surveillance and reinforce the wave of autocratic retrenchment and democratic erosion currently underway. This article presents the first cross-country, plausibly causal evidence that these concerns are justified, but adds nuance.
>Huawei transfers are driven chiefly by demand in recipient countries. More populous countries represent more attractive markets for Huawei, while less affluent countries are more likely to be attracted by its lower price point. Huawei transfers are also more likely if the recipient government has a preexisting relationship with Beijing. The effects of these transfers, we find, depend on political institutions in recipient countries. In autocracies, where the chief political threat to incumbents is collective action by citizens and institutional oversight is weak, Huawei transfers lead to an expansion of digital surveillance, internet shutdowns, internet filtering, and targeted arrests for online content. In democracies, where governments have stronger incentivizes to provide public goods, institutional oversight is stronger, and civil societies are more vibrant, Huawei transfers have no clear or consistent effect on digital repression.
>Our empirical analysis has three limitations, which constitute important directions for future research. First, since digital repression is concealed and hence intrinsically difficult to measure, we use the V-Dem project’s expert-coded indices. Although the indices permit broad comparisons across regime types – our results suggest that Huawei transfers generate an increase in digital repression of between 10% and 25% of the difference in means between autocracies and democracies – we are unable to be more specific. Given the rise of digital repression across the world, we view better cross-national data as key. Second, since Huawei is secretive about its contracts, our statistical estimates may be subject to measurement error. Huawei contracts, like other Chinese infrastructure contracts, routinely include confidentiality clauses (Gelpern et al. [Reference Gelpern, Horn, Morris, Parks and Trebesch2022](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/exporting-the-tools-of-dictatorship-the-politics-of-chinas-technology-transfers/D1A5B1D7C7A21FB5E601A553E6E8833F#r49); Walker [Reference Walker2023](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/exporting-the-tools-of-dictatorship-the-politics-of-chinas-technology-transfers/D1A5B1D7C7A21FB5E601A553E6E8833F#r93)), which prohibit recipient governments from divulging information about them. Consequently, our record of Huawei transfers may be incomplete, which would effectively include some treated countries in the control group. Since this would bias against our key results, our statistical estimates should be regarded as lower bounds, with the actual effect potentially larger. Third, Huawei’s secrecy means that we also lack fine-grained data about what its transfers entail. Consequently, we cannot ascertain whether certain provisions within contracts are more likely to facilitate digital repression than others. This is almost certainly the case. Transfers that entail “Safe City” infrastructure, for instance, are almost certainly more likely to facilitate digital repression than contracts that focus on IT training for university students. Likewise, Huawei may be inclined to provide some recipient governments more direct personnel support than others, helping them overcome state capacity limitations that might otherwise prevent them from using technology transfers for digital repression. In this article, we use the value of the transfer as a proxy for its substance. This, we believe, makes sense. More expensive contracts are more likely to entail sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure and direct personnel support than less valuable contracts. With more fine-grained contract data, however, policymakers could construct early-warning systems that would identify the transfers most at-risk for human rights violations in recipient countries.
!ping Democracy