It is in Canada’s interests to maintain peace in the region, to uphold international rule-of-law, to protect the interests of smaller states against larger ones, and to keep Taiwan as a reliable member of global supply chains.
[…]
Taiwan, even if it is still called the Republic of China, meets all of the criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention. Canadian courts have even judged that Taiwan must be treated as a state in their jurisdictions, even if the government denies formal recognition of Taiwan for the sake of diplomacy with China.
Canadian policy is already based on the knowledge that Taiwan is completely autonomous from PRC rule, which is why Canada promised in its Indo-Pacific Strategy to protect Taiwan’s resilience. This requires clarity within Canada, including making a clear public distinction between the “One-China Principle” that China wants to impose on the world and our own “One-China Policy.” As a sovereign state, Canada has the right to define that policy and determine our own relationship with Taiwan without external interference. There are many actions that Canada can take in the short-, intermediate-, and long-term to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience, prepare for unwanted contingencies, and lay the groundwork for the people of Taiwan to eventually fully exercise their right to self determination as promised in international law.
The goal is to preserve the status quo of peace and security in the Taiwan Strait in protection of Canada’s interests. Key actions include:
* With our allies, continue naval transits of the Taiwan Strait and diplomatic efforts promoting peace and stability. These actions need to be accompanied by public diplomacy clearly stating that the Taiwan Strait constitutes international waters under international law, and that stability and freedom of navigation in the region is a global public good.
* Make it clear to the Canadian public that there is a difference between Canada’s own “One-China Policy” and the “One-China Principle” promoted by the PRC. The Canadian public must know about the importance of Taiwan to Canada, and understand that our actions are intended to protect Canadian interests. This can help us counter disinformation from China and its enablers in Canada.
* Convey to the Taiwanese people through public diplomacy that the international community supports their democracy. Signs of external support can help the Taiwanese people avoid the sense of isolation that makes them vulnerable to PRC cognitive warfare.
* Deepen co-operation with Taiwan, as well as neighbouring states of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines, on defence, security, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing, in ways that collectively deter Chinese aggressive actions.
* Expand bilateral trade and investment with Taiwan in ways that enhance supply chain resilience. This includes tightening collaboration on semiconductors and AI, as well as the supply of Canadian minerals and energy solutions to Taiwan.
1 Comment
It is in Canada’s interests to maintain peace in the region, to uphold international rule-of-law, to protect the interests of smaller states against larger ones, and to keep Taiwan as a reliable member of global supply chains.
[…]
Taiwan, even if it is still called the Republic of China, meets all of the criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention. Canadian courts have even judged that Taiwan must be treated as a state in their jurisdictions, even if the government denies formal recognition of Taiwan for the sake of diplomacy with China.
Canadian policy is already based on the knowledge that Taiwan is completely autonomous from PRC rule, which is why Canada promised in its Indo-Pacific Strategy to protect Taiwan’s resilience. This requires clarity within Canada, including making a clear public distinction between the “One-China Principle” that China wants to impose on the world and our own “One-China Policy.” As a sovereign state, Canada has the right to define that policy and determine our own relationship with Taiwan without external interference. There are many actions that Canada can take in the short-, intermediate-, and long-term to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience, prepare for unwanted contingencies, and lay the groundwork for the people of Taiwan to eventually fully exercise their right to self determination as promised in international law.
The goal is to preserve the status quo of peace and security in the Taiwan Strait in protection of Canada’s interests. Key actions include:
* With our allies, continue naval transits of the Taiwan Strait and diplomatic efforts promoting peace and stability. These actions need to be accompanied by public diplomacy clearly stating that the Taiwan Strait constitutes international waters under international law, and that stability and freedom of navigation in the region is a global public good.
* Make it clear to the Canadian public that there is a difference between Canada’s own “One-China Policy” and the “One-China Principle” promoted by the PRC. The Canadian public must know about the importance of Taiwan to Canada, and understand that our actions are intended to protect Canadian interests. This can help us counter disinformation from China and its enablers in Canada.
* Convey to the Taiwanese people through public diplomacy that the international community supports their democracy. Signs of external support can help the Taiwanese people avoid the sense of isolation that makes them vulnerable to PRC cognitive warfare.
* Deepen co-operation with Taiwan, as well as neighbouring states of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines, on defence, security, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing, in ways that collectively deter Chinese aggressive actions.
* Expand bilateral trade and investment with Taiwan in ways that enhance supply chain resilience. This includes tightening collaboration on semiconductors and AI, as well as the supply of Canadian minerals and energy solutions to Taiwan.
!ping Can&International-relations