Now, three weeks into the attack, Ukrainian forces are holding territory and continuing offensive operations. They appear intent on consolidating a defensible buffer inside Russia.
This offensive has shifted the formerly gloomy narrative, at least for the moment, about the negative trajectory of the war. But Kyiv must decide what to make of its initial win. The offensive has yet to draw significant Russian forces from Ukraine’s eastern regions, and it remains unclear how Ukraine’s leaders intend to translate this tactical success into strategic or political gains. The offensive offers opportunities, but also carries considerable risks and costs. So far, Ukraine’s operations have been conducted by a mixed grouping of units, featuring perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers in total, with elements of regular brigades and Ukrainian special operations forces.
[…]
By redirecting resources away from defensive efforts in the eastern Donetsk region, Ukraine is betting that other parts of the 750-mile front won’t collapse, that it will not lose a large number of soldiers and equipment in Kursk, and that the benefits from its operations in Kursk will outweigh the costs sustained elsewhere. Ukraine’s military leadership also hoped the incursion would divert Russian forces from its front lines in the east; however, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, said that Russia has instead intensified its efforts and deployed its most combat-ready units to the Pokrovsk front in Donetsk. Politically, Ukraine is also likely gambling that it can hold Kursk long enough to use it as a bargaining chip in the event that Kyiv is pressured to conduct negotiations. This could work if there is a way to compel Moscow to negotiate on such preferred timelines. But the territory could further strain Ukraine’s military over the winter. Either way, Kyiv hopes the Kursk offensive will spur a change in the perception that the war is on a negative trajectory, unlocking additional material assistance and altering the West’s weapons restrictions.
[…]
**NOT WAITING**
[…]
The offensive does not redress the current materiel imbalance in the war. For now, Russia retains an advantage in manpower, equipment, and ammunition. This advantage has not proved decisive, or led to operationally significant breakthroughs, but Russian forces have steadily gained 750 square miles of territory since October 2023, and they have kept advancing in the weeks since Ukraine pushed into Kursk. Recently, the pace of that advance has accelerated, and Ukraine’s position looks increasingly precarious along parts of the front.
[…]
More important is the balance of attrition. Holding a prepared defense is easier than offense and typically less costly. Before the Kursk operation, Ukraine was slowly bleeding Russian offensive power in exchange for territory gained. That kept the risk of a Russian breakthrough low, and it offered Ukraine the chance to rebuild its exhausted military over the coming months. […] his was not an especially daring or novel approach, but it was effective. After a new mobilization law went into effect in May, Ukraine more than doubled the number of volunteers and mobilized soldiers joining the military. Ukraine was steadily addressing its deficit of manpower and fortifications, increasing attrition to Russian forces on the battlefield, and supporting infrastructure behind the frontlines. In this context, the Kursk offensive freights Ukraine’s position with added risk.
The attacking force in Kursk was composed of pieces from many brigades, assault battalions, and specialized units. Unless rotated back, these troops will not be able to plug gaps, serve as reserves, or counter Russian advances inside Ukraine. The offensive, in other words, weakens Ukraine’s already shaky front. Following Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in May, Ukraine’s military has been stretched thin, with defensive lines buckling across Donetsk. Russian forces have also been pushing Ukrainian lines back along several axes running from Vuhledar to Pokrovsk, Toretsk to Chasiv Yar, and near Kupiansk.
This is not to say that the offensive was inherently ill conceived. The operation was well-executed and quickly achieved several limited, but important, objectives, which would have made it an effective one-week raid. If it could pull significant Russian forces from other fronts, then the payoff would be more than worth the risk. But thus far, there is little evidence of it doing so.
The timing and organization of the offensive suggests that Ukraine’s leaders judged they needed to act. One possible reason is the looming U.S. election, which threatens to push Kyiv into negotiations with Moscow while in a position of weakness. In theory, by seizing Russian territory, Ukraine can significantly improve its bargaining power. […] Right now, there is no compelling reason for why Moscow must negotiate while Ukraine holds its territory, and no indication that it might be inclined to do so. If anything, Russia is likely to maintain offensive pressure along the frontline while building up forces to eventually counterattack at Kursk. A Russian attack could be more effective in the winter, once the dense foliage in tree lines used by Ukrainian forces for concealment dissipates.
**AN UNEXPECTED OFFENSIVE**
[…]
The Ukrainian military demonstrated that it had learned from past offensives, bringing mine-clearing vehicles, air defense, and electronic warfare systems to support the initial assault. Ukraine also seems to have achieved success countering Russian reconnaissance drones with first-person-view drones at the beginning, limiting Russia’s ability to quickly respond. Even though Russian drones detected and observed the offensive, Ukraine achieved operational surprise. Planning appears to have been closely held, even within Ukraine’s own government circles. Kyiv did not inform international partners, who might have discouraged it or leaked the plans. During past operations, such as Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive or its second raid into Russia’s Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, Russian forces appeared well positioned in advance with detailed knowledge of Ukrainian planning.
[…]
In an ode to the 2022 Kharkiv offensive, which was also planned by the Ukrainian commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian units leveraged speed, sowing confusion as they flew down roads through multiple towns. Early Russian efforts to send reinforcements were countered with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes, destroying columns of Russian troops that were careless in their positioning. The initial Russian response has been shambolic, typical of the military leadership’s inability to respond to dynamic situations.
[…]
Russia’s response to Kursk, thus far, appears to be an economy of force effort to contain the incursion, as it continues to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk. Moscow may be showing a degree of caution, aware that, in past years, Ukraine has typically launched attacks on multiple axes. It is possible that this is not Ukraine’s only planned offensive operation.
Russia’s air force has shifted air support from other fronts, particularly from Kharkiv, to counter the Kursk incursion, but the overall Russian offensive effort has not slowed. Most recently, Russian units have captured most of Niu-York, advanced into Toretsk, and come within artillery range of Pokrovsk. As a key transit hub, Pokrovsk important for sustaining defense in Donetsk and blocking further Russian advances. Even if Russia cannot quickly capture the city, placing Pokrvosk within artillery range has forced civilians to flee and will prevent its use as a rail hub for the area. The Russian advance there also threatens Ukraine’s flanks and could force a larger retreat down from Kurakhove and Vuhledar. The Kursk offensive has left Ukraine short on reserves to respond to any Russian breakthrough and, in some cases, rationing artillery ammunition.
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Archived version: [https://archive.fo/Eq078](https://archive.fo/Eq078)
Summary:
Now, three weeks into the attack, Ukrainian forces are holding territory and continuing offensive operations. They appear intent on consolidating a defensible buffer inside Russia.
This offensive has shifted the formerly gloomy narrative, at least for the moment, about the negative trajectory of the war. But Kyiv must decide what to make of its initial win. The offensive has yet to draw significant Russian forces from Ukraine’s eastern regions, and it remains unclear how Ukraine’s leaders intend to translate this tactical success into strategic or political gains. The offensive offers opportunities, but also carries considerable risks and costs. So far, Ukraine’s operations have been conducted by a mixed grouping of units, featuring perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers in total, with elements of regular brigades and Ukrainian special operations forces.
[…]
By redirecting resources away from defensive efforts in the eastern Donetsk region, Ukraine is betting that other parts of the 750-mile front won’t collapse, that it will not lose a large number of soldiers and equipment in Kursk, and that the benefits from its operations in Kursk will outweigh the costs sustained elsewhere. Ukraine’s military leadership also hoped the incursion would divert Russian forces from its front lines in the east; however, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, said that Russia has instead intensified its efforts and deployed its most combat-ready units to the Pokrovsk front in Donetsk. Politically, Ukraine is also likely gambling that it can hold Kursk long enough to use it as a bargaining chip in the event that Kyiv is pressured to conduct negotiations. This could work if there is a way to compel Moscow to negotiate on such preferred timelines. But the territory could further strain Ukraine’s military over the winter. Either way, Kyiv hopes the Kursk offensive will spur a change in the perception that the war is on a negative trajectory, unlocking additional material assistance and altering the West’s weapons restrictions.
[…]
**NOT WAITING**
[…]
The offensive does not redress the current materiel imbalance in the war. For now, Russia retains an advantage in manpower, equipment, and ammunition. This advantage has not proved decisive, or led to operationally significant breakthroughs, but Russian forces have steadily gained 750 square miles of territory since October 2023, and they have kept advancing in the weeks since Ukraine pushed into Kursk. Recently, the pace of that advance has accelerated, and Ukraine’s position looks increasingly precarious along parts of the front.
[…]
More important is the balance of attrition. Holding a prepared defense is easier than offense and typically less costly. Before the Kursk operation, Ukraine was slowly bleeding Russian offensive power in exchange for territory gained. That kept the risk of a Russian breakthrough low, and it offered Ukraine the chance to rebuild its exhausted military over the coming months. […] his was not an especially daring or novel approach, but it was effective. After a new mobilization law went into effect in May, Ukraine more than doubled the number of volunteers and mobilized soldiers joining the military. Ukraine was steadily addressing its deficit of manpower and fortifications, increasing attrition to Russian forces on the battlefield, and supporting infrastructure behind the frontlines. In this context, the Kursk offensive freights Ukraine’s position with added risk.
The attacking force in Kursk was composed of pieces from many brigades, assault battalions, and specialized units. Unless rotated back, these troops will not be able to plug gaps, serve as reserves, or counter Russian advances inside Ukraine. The offensive, in other words, weakens Ukraine’s already shaky front. Following Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in May, Ukraine’s military has been stretched thin, with defensive lines buckling across Donetsk. Russian forces have also been pushing Ukrainian lines back along several axes running from Vuhledar to Pokrovsk, Toretsk to Chasiv Yar, and near Kupiansk.
This is not to say that the offensive was inherently ill conceived. The operation was well-executed and quickly achieved several limited, but important, objectives, which would have made it an effective one-week raid. If it could pull significant Russian forces from other fronts, then the payoff would be more than worth the risk. But thus far, there is little evidence of it doing so.
The timing and organization of the offensive suggests that Ukraine’s leaders judged they needed to act. One possible reason is the looming U.S. election, which threatens to push Kyiv into negotiations with Moscow while in a position of weakness. In theory, by seizing Russian territory, Ukraine can significantly improve its bargaining power. […] Right now, there is no compelling reason for why Moscow must negotiate while Ukraine holds its territory, and no indication that it might be inclined to do so. If anything, Russia is likely to maintain offensive pressure along the frontline while building up forces to eventually counterattack at Kursk. A Russian attack could be more effective in the winter, once the dense foliage in tree lines used by Ukrainian forces for concealment dissipates.
**AN UNEXPECTED OFFENSIVE**
[…]
The Ukrainian military demonstrated that it had learned from past offensives, bringing mine-clearing vehicles, air defense, and electronic warfare systems to support the initial assault. Ukraine also seems to have achieved success countering Russian reconnaissance drones with first-person-view drones at the beginning, limiting Russia’s ability to quickly respond. Even though Russian drones detected and observed the offensive, Ukraine achieved operational surprise. Planning appears to have been closely held, even within Ukraine’s own government circles. Kyiv did not inform international partners, who might have discouraged it or leaked the plans. During past operations, such as Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive or its second raid into Russia’s Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, Russian forces appeared well positioned in advance with detailed knowledge of Ukrainian planning.
[…]
In an ode to the 2022 Kharkiv offensive, which was also planned by the Ukrainian commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian units leveraged speed, sowing confusion as they flew down roads through multiple towns. Early Russian efforts to send reinforcements were countered with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes, destroying columns of Russian troops that were careless in their positioning. The initial Russian response has been shambolic, typical of the military leadership’s inability to respond to dynamic situations.
[…]
Russia’s response to Kursk, thus far, appears to be an economy of force effort to contain the incursion, as it continues to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk. Moscow may be showing a degree of caution, aware that, in past years, Ukraine has typically launched attacks on multiple axes. It is possible that this is not Ukraine’s only planned offensive operation.
Russia’s air force has shifted air support from other fronts, particularly from Kharkiv, to counter the Kursk incursion, but the overall Russian offensive effort has not slowed. Most recently, Russian units have captured most of Niu-York, advanced into Toretsk, and come within artillery range of Pokrovsk. As a key transit hub, Pokrovsk important for sustaining defense in Donetsk and blocking further Russian advances. Even if Russia cannot quickly capture the city, placing Pokrvosk within artillery range has forced civilians to flee and will prevent its use as a rail hub for the area. The Russian advance there also threatens Ukraine’s flanks and could force a larger retreat down from Kurakhove and Vuhledar. The Kursk offensive has left Ukraine short on reserves to respond to any Russian breakthrough and, in some cases, rationing artillery ammunition.