Islamists versus Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood’s return to Syria threatens confrontation with Sharaa

>Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood, weakened by internal fragmentation and intellectual erosion, finds itself facing a new regime eager to monopolise Sunni representation and an exhausted society longing for stability. Some call for its dissolution or reinvention while others advocate reform or integration into the new state. A younger generation of activists, meanwhile, believes the moment has arrived to reclaim a lost role. Could Syria be heading towards its first Islamist versus Islamist rupture?

>A close look at the Muslim Brotherhood’s trajectory in Syria over the past fifteen years reveals a sharp decline in political, religious, social and relief activity. Politically, it failed to steer or shape the revolution, despite issuing its 2012 “Covenant and Charter” outlining a vision for a civil democratic state built on justice, accountability and national reconciliation. The document quickly disappeared from view, overwhelmed by the rise of Salafist ideas and ignored by secular revolutionary circles. 

>Although the group held numerical dominance within the Syrian National Council – established in late 2011 as the first representative opposition body – and helped choose its presidents, its influence faded rapidly within its successor, the National Coalition. Newer political figures took the helm, and decision-making ultimately concentrated in the hands of a small circle that tightened its grip on the Coalition. In the 2023 elections, the Brotherhood secured just one seat in the politburo out of 24. It secured a second only through Ankara’s intercession.

>On the religious front, the Brotherhood’s impact dwindled as the simpler, more energised Salafi narrative captured the imagination of youth and opposition fighters. The Brotherhood’s elitist discourse failed to resonate with popular bases or attract armed groups. It even lost Ahrar al-Sham, the armed group that had roots in Brotherhood-linked Damascene families. Socially, its supporters were largely urban and middle-class. It failed to penetrate rural or lower-income communities that formed the backbone of the uprising.  In the humanitarian field, most organisations linked directly or indirectly to the Brotherhood collapsed due to dwindling funding, with many members shifting towards secular international NGOs to distance themselves from any perceived “toxic” affiliation to the Brotherhood.

>Leadership stagnation compounded these flaws. The doctrine of “consensus figures” – leaders who avoid upsetting anyone yet convince no one – kept the organisation politically inert and spiritually drained. This approach characterised the eight-year tenure of former General Supervisor Mohammad Hikmat Walid and continued under his successor, Amer al-Bouslama (aka Abu al-Miqdad), undermining any prospect of the Brotherhood playing a leading role during the revolution.

>With the fall of Assad and the rise of a new regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Brotherhood faced an existential question: can it return to public life; or will it remain a mere witness to history?

>Soon after 8 December 2024, the group began reopening offices across provinces and reconnecting with old cadres, including ageing leaders who had remained in Syria without engaging organisationally for years. Yet attracting new members – especially among youth – proved difficult. Their reluctance to appear publicly in a manner that might provoke the new regime, coupled with longstanding reliance on clandestine methods and the slow process of building trust before recruitment, further hindered expansion and impact.
In this climate, five internal factions emerged.

>The first, representing senior religious figures, advocates maintaining a cautious path, warning against any confrontation with Sharaa. They repeat a wry saying: “If the Muslim cannot thrive, he should at least conceal himself.”

>The second calls for total withdrawal from politics and a return to religious, social and relief work. Its members argue that post-war conditions favour moral and educational engagement and assert that political activism has become too risky after 7 October 2023 and the resultant tightening regional and international restrictions on the Brotherhood. They consider the new state a potentially viable platform for a future Islamic state, and that it is best not to rock the boat at this stage. 

>The third current, led by younger members, believes that the Brotherhood’s long-awaited moment has arrived. They assert that remaining silent now would mean certain exclusion later; and they warn of the government’s drive towards exclusivity and monopolising Sunni legitimacy, claiming that it could even evolve into a Sunni monarchy. Preserving “Sunni rule”, they argue, should not imply acquiescing to personalised authoritarianism.

>The fourth faction adopts a pragmatic line, urging participation within the state, seeing the institutional vacuum as an opening for co-option – especially since the government has appointed individuals with Brotherhood backgrounds to administrative posts.

>The fifth and most radical faction calls for dissolving the group entirely and the launch of fresh initiatives with more flexible frameworks. It argues that the historic organisation has become a liability. Members of this group – including senior figure Mulham al-Droubi – have already staged walk outs. 
The so-called “dissolution crisis” erupted against this backdrop. It came to a head with a strongly-worded article by Ahmed Mowafak Zaidan – special adviser to President Sharaa – published on Al Jazeera’s website on 22 August.