Canada, Japan and Australia: Swing States or Pawns for China?

>A look at the diplomacy of Japan, Australia, and Canada shows that reengagement has indeed happened. These three countries all started from a high point in trade and mutual linkages with China, only to go through a protracted period of trade tensions and in some cases acute political and diplomatic crises. Today, **without apologizing for downturns that were largely due to China’s own behavior, they seek to normalize the relationship, and perhaps to upgrade it**. This is the case of Australia’s recently re-elected Labor government, even if it still endorses its predecessors’ Indo-Pacific strategy, Canada’s Liberal government embroiled in acrimonious debates with the United States, and Japan’s Liberal Democrats clinging to their traditional relationship with Washington but seeking a form of normalization with Beijing.

>An exploration of Chinese views on this **shift and the relative** ***détente*** **reveals that it is highly conditional on China’s part**: The main concession being a fall in aggressive rhetoric, except when the United States or supposed local “hawks” are castigated as the culprits for previously souring relations. That military issues are paramount, whether China’s offensive or defensive positions, is well demonstrated in Australia’s case. 

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>In a nutshell, this gives away Beijing’s strategy toward all but the number one global power: Talk the walk rather than walk the talk. **There is now more frankness in acknowledging hyperrealism**. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs [Wang Yi admitted to Kaja Kallas](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/china-tells-eu-it-cannot-afford-russian-loss-ukraine-war-sources-say), the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that China cannot accept Russia’s defeat. This follows years of pretended “neutrality” on an issue that Europeans placed on top of their agenda with Beijing. Lambasting Vietnam for accepting US additional duties on reexports from China is also a broad recognition that China uses all available detours in its international trade.

>This could be one of the factors that has **pushed the new Trump administration to tactics that often mirror China’s own actions**. While China is usually more polite about it, both countries now favor bilateral and issue by issue negotiations and, in principle or in practice, shun multilateral agreements. [Both use extraterritorial means](https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/us-extraterritoriality-trump-card.pdf), and both impose duties or other coercive measures as bargaining tools.

>This paradox should not be pushed too far as we are in front of unfolding events: The United States does walk back measures, sometimes very quickly, while China remains more predictable, mostly on the side of rigidity. What this demonstrates is that, seen from Beijing, **small or middle nations have no agency, unless they have an irreplaceable asset and no vulnerability to trade or security threats**. Very few cases of agency remain, in a world where the United States and China are the first and second economic and military powers-with the ensuing dependencies from their partners. To counter trade fragmentation and, more broadly, the breakdown of international rules, do these other nations have the wherewithal to form coalitions based on shared interests: What Thucydides would have called a Lacedemonian League or, more aptly, an Achaean League? **This coalition would have to counter Athens (the United States) when needed, while excluding Sparta or Macedonia (China) in principle**. That is a tall order, yet that may be our challenge in the immediate future.

!ping Foreign-policy