>In December, a band of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham shocked the world by ousting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Shara, created a government to oversee the country’s transition. Shara is a former jihadist who once led al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Nonetheless, U.S. President Donald Trump soon threw his weight behind him, describing him as “tough” and “attractive” after meeting him in May. Since then, the United States has suspended sanctions against Syria and issued statements in support of Shara’s interim government.
>Since Shara assumed power, he has courted foreign support by disavowing jihadism and raising the prospect of normalizing Syria’s relations with Israel. Such rhetoric, combined with his relatively successful rule over Syrian Sunnis in Idlib Province during the final years of the civil war, persuaded current and former U.S. officials that Shara was the man for the moment.
>Today, Syria is once again racked by violence, and Shara’s coalition includes unreformed jihadists. The problem with Washington’s Syria policy is not that it backs a former al-Qaeda ally but that it endorses Shara’s vision of centralized rule over a diverse and sectarian country riven by deep mistrust. In July, the U.S. special envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, went so far as to rule out U.S. support for any sort of federal arrangement, such as allowing for local control of policing.
>The transitional government in Damascus has fiercely repudiated federalism, which it sees as a prelude to anarchy, state disintegration, and the loss of HTS control. Nearby examples hardly inspire confidence: Lebanon’s consociational system and Iraq’s federal one are marginally functional. And some of Shara’s allies believe it is the prerogative of Syria’s Sunni Muslims, who make up a majority of the population, to rule over religious minorities.
>Shara and his closest advisers lack a clear vision of the country they want to build. They are used to running Idlib, a small city with one main street, as a haven for Islamists—not a large, multiethnic state. Moreover, Shara is not an all-powerful authoritarian; he is constrained by his inner circle and makes decisions in consultation with them. His advisers are inclined to hoard power.
>For the country to have a chance at recovering from 50 years of despotism and a decade of civil war, it must allow minority communities to retain a degree of autonomy. Syria is likely to be ruled by a strongman, and without some form of federalism, intense intercommunal violence will continue. If minorities fear a predatory central government, they will resist and potentially enlist outside powers in their fight. A return to civil war is not out of the question. Syria’s partners, including the United States, should encourage a power-sharing arrangement.
>When Assad was toppled, Shara struck many foreign governments as the right person to govern Syria. Syria’s Sunni Arabs assumed that the country could no longer be ruled by a religious or ethnic minority—such as the Assads, who were Alawite—and that the Islamists who forced Assad out would be part of the next government. Washington recognized that its influence over the transition would be limited. The United States did have clout in northeastern Syria because for years it maintained a small military presence there to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and to disrupt Iran’s access to Lebanon. Now that ISIS appears a shell of its former self and Syria is run by a government that is staunchly opposed to Iran, Trump has begun to remove troops from seven of the eight U.S. bases in Syria.
Lower_Nubia on
Stop killing civilians. Publicised trial of violators, execute the guilty.
Standard_Ad7704 on
I am sharing this article to encourage debate and discussion about the current Syrian order. However, I find it to be a one-sided account, both in its narration of events and its opinions.
Despite this, it represents an important stance held by a significant minority of Syrians, though I suspect this view is probably held by the majority.
bigwang123 on
Lmfao that’s a horribly dishonest framing of the violence against the Druze
An estimated 60 thousand fighters began mobilizing, which the IAF sought to disrupt. Seeing this imminent and apocalyptic threat to the Syrian Druze, what did Israel do? They backed off, allowing the Syrian government, which they had decried as being anti-Druze and complicit in the violence just days before, to once again operate within Sweida.
Never mind the fact that it also completely ignores the factional conflict between pro and anti-government Druze clerics
If you’re going to call for a specific policy, make sure your version of events aligns with reality
4 Comments
>In December, a band of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham shocked the world by ousting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Shara, created a government to oversee the country’s transition. Shara is a former jihadist who once led al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Nonetheless, U.S. President Donald Trump soon threw his weight behind him, describing him as “tough” and “attractive” after meeting him in May. Since then, the United States has suspended sanctions against Syria and issued statements in support of Shara’s interim government.
>Since Shara assumed power, he has courted foreign support by disavowing jihadism and raising the prospect of normalizing Syria’s relations with Israel. Such rhetoric, combined with his relatively successful rule over Syrian Sunnis in Idlib Province during the final years of the civil war, persuaded current and former U.S. officials that Shara was the man for the moment.
>Today, Syria is once again racked by violence, and Shara’s coalition includes unreformed jihadists. The problem with Washington’s Syria policy is not that it backs a former al-Qaeda ally but that it endorses Shara’s vision of centralized rule over a diverse and sectarian country riven by deep mistrust. In July, the U.S. special envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, went so far as to rule out U.S. support for any sort of federal arrangement, such as allowing for local control of policing.
>The transitional government in Damascus has fiercely repudiated federalism, which it sees as a prelude to anarchy, state disintegration, and the loss of HTS control. Nearby examples hardly inspire confidence: Lebanon’s consociational system and Iraq’s federal one are marginally functional. And some of Shara’s allies believe it is the prerogative of Syria’s Sunni Muslims, who make up a majority of the population, to rule over religious minorities.
>Shara and his closest advisers lack a clear vision of the country they want to build. They are used to running Idlib, a small city with one main street, as a haven for Islamists—not a large, multiethnic state. Moreover, Shara is not an all-powerful authoritarian; he is constrained by his inner circle and makes decisions in consultation with them. His advisers are inclined to hoard power.
>For the country to have a chance at recovering from 50 years of despotism and a decade of civil war, it must allow minority communities to retain a degree of autonomy. Syria is likely to be ruled by a strongman, and without some form of federalism, intense intercommunal violence will continue. If minorities fear a predatory central government, they will resist and potentially enlist outside powers in their fight. A return to civil war is not out of the question. Syria’s partners, including the United States, should encourage a power-sharing arrangement.
>When Assad was toppled, Shara struck many foreign governments as the right person to govern Syria. Syria’s Sunni Arabs assumed that the country could no longer be ruled by a religious or ethnic minority—such as the Assads, who were Alawite—and that the Islamists who forced Assad out would be part of the next government. Washington recognized that its influence over the transition would be limited. The United States did have clout in northeastern Syria because for years it maintained a small military presence there to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and to disrupt Iran’s access to Lebanon. Now that ISIS appears a shell of its former self and Syria is run by a government that is staunchly opposed to Iran, Trump has begun to remove troops from seven of the eight U.S. bases in Syria.
Stop killing civilians. Publicised trial of violators, execute the guilty.
I am sharing this article to encourage debate and discussion about the current Syrian order. However, I find it to be a one-sided account, both in its narration of events and its opinions.
Despite this, it represents an important stance held by a significant minority of Syrians, though I suspect this view is probably held by the majority.
Lmfao that’s a horribly dishonest framing of the violence against the Druze
An estimated 60 thousand fighters began mobilizing, which the IAF sought to disrupt. Seeing this imminent and apocalyptic threat to the Syrian Druze, what did Israel do? They backed off, allowing the Syrian government, which they had decried as being anti-Druze and complicit in the violence just days before, to once again operate within Sweida.
Never mind the fact that it also completely ignores the factional conflict between pro and anti-government Druze clerics
If you’re going to call for a specific policy, make sure your version of events aligns with reality