>On October 24, 2023, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber was flying a nighttime mission in international airspace over the South China Sea when it was intercepted by a Chinese fighter jet. In a series of dangerous high-speed maneuvers, the jet pilot flew within ten feet of the bomber, endangering both aircraft and crews. This came on the heels of a June 2023 incident when the USS Chung-Hoon, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was sailing through the Taiwan Strait and a Chinese warship overtook her on the port side at high speed. The Chinese ship then abruptly tacked and crossed her bow at 150 yards, causing the Chung-Hoon to slow her speed quickly to avoid a collision. The Chinese warship ignored repeated attempts at ship-to-ship communication and violated standard operating procedures for close encounters on the high seas.
>These are but two near misses in recent years between the U.S. military and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Although U.S. military strategists and planners are increasingly focused on preparing for intentional Chinese military actions in the Western Pacific, especially regarding Taiwan, these close calls have created substantial anxiety among U.S. analysts that an accident or miscommunication between the U.S. military and the PLA could pull the two countries into a conflict neither one desires.
>These concerns are not new. For decades, the United States has tried to place guardrails on its military relationship with China, oftentimes borrowing from the playbook it used to keep U.S.-Soviet relations stable during the Cold War. During the 1990s, when Washington still enjoyed overriding military advantages over Beijing, U.S. strategists focused on reassurance, such as military dialogues and communication protocols. Today, as the Chinese military increases its presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea and as U.S.-Chinese tensions simmer from trade to technology, U.S. officials are more focused on confidence-building measures, which aim to create greater predictability in military operations, as well as crisis communications to ensure that a small mishap does not snowball into a full-scale war. “China is the most rapidly growing military, and the most rapidly growing nuclear power, in the world. The U.S. has the biggest military in the world,” U.S. Representative Adam Smith said while visiting Beijing last month. “It is dangerous for us not to be having regular communications about our capabilities and intentions.”
>But despite repeated attempts on the part of U.S. officials to improve military-to-military communications, the Chinese side has resisted establishing and codifying even basic rules of the road. Although the reasons for Beijing’s ambivalence have evolved, what has remained consistent is a deep skepticism that U.S.-led initiatives will advance China’s interests. It will not be easy for Washington to overcome such long-standing suspicions. But now that U.S. and Chinese military capabilities are seen as comparable and the dangers of potential escalation have grown, U.S. officials looking to reengage U.S.-Chinese military diplomacy must understand this deep distrust—and then do what they reasonably can to overcome it.
>THE SOVIET PLAYBOOK
>U.S.-Soviet military diplomacy during the Cold War has long served as a model for successful relations between competing armed forces. Despite being existential nuclear adversaries, the two states developed significant military-to-military contacts during the later part of the Cold War. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, for example, sought to prevent ship collisions and reduce the risk of accidental escalation at sea. The 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Incidents Agreement sought to limit the use of certain weaponry, such as lasers that could potentially blind when aimed recklessly. These agreements were far from panaceas—U.S. and Soviet forces did have numerous dangerous and harrowing encounters—but they played an important role in preempting escalation.
>At the beginning of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in the early 1980s, American strategists tried to apply these general models to relations with Beijing’s armed forces. At the time, there were modest military contacts and exchanges, such as meetings on military doctrine and general training. But these efforts came to an abrupt halt in 1989, when Washington suspended them in response to Beijing’s military crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square. Relations rebounded slightly in the early 1990s but not enough to account for rising tensions.
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>On October 24, 2023, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber was flying a nighttime mission in international airspace over the South China Sea when it was intercepted by a Chinese fighter jet. In a series of dangerous high-speed maneuvers, the jet pilot flew within ten feet of the bomber, endangering both aircraft and crews. This came on the heels of a June 2023 incident when the USS Chung-Hoon, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was sailing through the Taiwan Strait and a Chinese warship overtook her on the port side at high speed. The Chinese ship then abruptly tacked and crossed her bow at 150 yards, causing the Chung-Hoon to slow her speed quickly to avoid a collision. The Chinese warship ignored repeated attempts at ship-to-ship communication and violated standard operating procedures for close encounters on the high seas.
>These are but two near misses in recent years between the U.S. military and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Although U.S. military strategists and planners are increasingly focused on preparing for intentional Chinese military actions in the Western Pacific, especially regarding Taiwan, these close calls have created substantial anxiety among U.S. analysts that an accident or miscommunication between the U.S. military and the PLA could pull the two countries into a conflict neither one desires.
>These concerns are not new. For decades, the United States has tried to place guardrails on its military relationship with China, oftentimes borrowing from the playbook it used to keep U.S.-Soviet relations stable during the Cold War. During the 1990s, when Washington still enjoyed overriding military advantages over Beijing, U.S. strategists focused on reassurance, such as military dialogues and communication protocols. Today, as the Chinese military increases its presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea and as U.S.-Chinese tensions simmer from trade to technology, U.S. officials are more focused on confidence-building measures, which aim to create greater predictability in military operations, as well as crisis communications to ensure that a small mishap does not snowball into a full-scale war. “China is the most rapidly growing military, and the most rapidly growing nuclear power, in the world. The U.S. has the biggest military in the world,” U.S. Representative Adam Smith said while visiting Beijing last month. “It is dangerous for us not to be having regular communications about our capabilities and intentions.”
>But despite repeated attempts on the part of U.S. officials to improve military-to-military communications, the Chinese side has resisted establishing and codifying even basic rules of the road. Although the reasons for Beijing’s ambivalence have evolved, what has remained consistent is a deep skepticism that U.S.-led initiatives will advance China’s interests. It will not be easy for Washington to overcome such long-standing suspicions. But now that U.S. and Chinese military capabilities are seen as comparable and the dangers of potential escalation have grown, U.S. officials looking to reengage U.S.-Chinese military diplomacy must understand this deep distrust—and then do what they reasonably can to overcome it.
>THE SOVIET PLAYBOOK
>U.S.-Soviet military diplomacy during the Cold War has long served as a model for successful relations between competing armed forces. Despite being existential nuclear adversaries, the two states developed significant military-to-military contacts during the later part of the Cold War. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, for example, sought to prevent ship collisions and reduce the risk of accidental escalation at sea. The 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Incidents Agreement sought to limit the use of certain weaponry, such as lasers that could potentially blind when aimed recklessly. These agreements were far from panaceas—U.S. and Soviet forces did have numerous dangerous and harrowing encounters—but they played an important role in preempting escalation.
>At the beginning of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in the early 1980s, American strategists tried to apply these general models to relations with Beijing’s armed forces. At the time, there were modest military contacts and exchanges, such as meetings on military doctrine and general training. But these efforts came to an abrupt halt in 1989, when Washington suspended them in response to Beijing’s military crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square. Relations rebounded slightly in the early 1990s but not enough to account for rising tensions.