>The regional order of the Middle East is rapidly evolving, but not in the way many Israeli and U.S. officials assume it is. U.S. President Donald Trump’s push to end the war in Gaza delivered the release of all the surviving Israeli hostages and a respite from the relentless killing and destruction that has so scarred the territory. That breakthrough raised hopes of a broader regional transformation, even if what comes after the initial cease-fire remains hugely uncertain. Trump himself speaks of the dawn of peace in the Middle East. If his deal prevents the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank, many Arab governments may once again be eager to explore normalizing ties with Israel. Indeed, Israelis saw how Arab leaders pressured Hamas to accept Trump’s deal as evidence that normalization could be back on the table.
>But even if the Gaza deal holds, this moment of U.S.-Israeli convergence won’t last. Israel’s mistaken belief that the country has established permanent strategic superiority over its adversaries will almost certainly lead it to take increasingly provocative actions that directly challenge the goals of the White House. The Gulf states that Israel dreams of bringing into its fold doubt that it is willing or able to protect their core interests. They are now less concerned about confronting Iran—and less convinced that the road to Washington leads through Tel Aviv. And Israel seems not to grasp the extent of Trump’s affinities with the Gulf states.
>Wishful thinking has pervaded the Israeli government and national security establishment, which have reveled in the opportunities created by the country’s exercise of strength. After the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel embarked on a cascading series of airstrikes and interventions across the region aimed not just at Hamas but at the entire Iranian-led axis, repeatedly crossing redlines that had long governed the regional shadow war, killing leaders who had been viewed as untouchable: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah with a massive bomb dropped in central Beirut, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Iranian safe house, multiple Iranian military commanders in Syria, and the Houthi prime minister of Yemen. Its bombing of nuclear and military sites in Iran represented the culmination of Israel’s long-held desire to strike at the heart of its greatest foe.
>An attack in the Gulf, however, has proved to be a surprising turning point. Israel’s shocking attempt to assassinate Hamas leaders gathered for U.S.-brokered negotiations in Doha in September represented a dramatic escalation of its bid to reshape the Middle East by airpower. That was the kind of gambit undertaken only by leaders completely convinced of their immunity from the consequences of their actions. But Trump decided that this time, Israel had gone too far. The indelible image of a scowling Trump watching Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sheepishly read a scripted apology on a phone call to the emir of Qatar seems emblematic of the shifting geopolitical moment that led to the initial cease-fire in Gaza.
>It is unclear whether Trump’s irritation with Israel will produce meaningful changes beyond the cease-fire. Citing supposed Hamas attacks in the south of Gaza, the Israeli military has resumed bombarding parts of the territory this week. Israel would be far better served by stepping back from the brink and embracing the opportunity offered by the cease-fire to dial down its military adventurism and seek the kind of sustainable regional order that can be reached only through serious movement toward a Palestinian state. Protracted conflict has exposed Israel’s shortcomings: its missile defenses do not offer perfect security, its economy cannot sustain endless war, its domestic politics are convulsed after the long period of strife in Gaza, and its military remains deeply dependent on the United States. The devastation of Gaza has destroyed Israel’s standing in the world, leaving the country increasingly isolated and alone.
>Israel cannot bomb the Middle East into a stable new order. Regional leadership requires more than military primacy. It also demands some degree of consent and cooperation from other regional powers. But nobody in the Middle East wants Israeli leadership, and all states now increasingly fear its unchecked might. Some in Washington celebrate the prospect of an unrestrained Israel laying waste to U.S. adversaries. But they should be careful what they wish for. Israel’s interests are not the same as those of the United States—and Israel is writing a lot of checks that the United States might not be willing or able to cash.
1 Comment
>The regional order of the Middle East is rapidly evolving, but not in the way many Israeli and U.S. officials assume it is. U.S. President Donald Trump’s push to end the war in Gaza delivered the release of all the surviving Israeli hostages and a respite from the relentless killing and destruction that has so scarred the territory. That breakthrough raised hopes of a broader regional transformation, even if what comes after the initial cease-fire remains hugely uncertain. Trump himself speaks of the dawn of peace in the Middle East. If his deal prevents the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank, many Arab governments may once again be eager to explore normalizing ties with Israel. Indeed, Israelis saw how Arab leaders pressured Hamas to accept Trump’s deal as evidence that normalization could be back on the table.
>But even if the Gaza deal holds, this moment of U.S.-Israeli convergence won’t last. Israel’s mistaken belief that the country has established permanent strategic superiority over its adversaries will almost certainly lead it to take increasingly provocative actions that directly challenge the goals of the White House. The Gulf states that Israel dreams of bringing into its fold doubt that it is willing or able to protect their core interests. They are now less concerned about confronting Iran—and less convinced that the road to Washington leads through Tel Aviv. And Israel seems not to grasp the extent of Trump’s affinities with the Gulf states.
>Wishful thinking has pervaded the Israeli government and national security establishment, which have reveled in the opportunities created by the country’s exercise of strength. After the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel embarked on a cascading series of airstrikes and interventions across the region aimed not just at Hamas but at the entire Iranian-led axis, repeatedly crossing redlines that had long governed the regional shadow war, killing leaders who had been viewed as untouchable: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah with a massive bomb dropped in central Beirut, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Iranian safe house, multiple Iranian military commanders in Syria, and the Houthi prime minister of Yemen. Its bombing of nuclear and military sites in Iran represented the culmination of Israel’s long-held desire to strike at the heart of its greatest foe.
>An attack in the Gulf, however, has proved to be a surprising turning point. Israel’s shocking attempt to assassinate Hamas leaders gathered for U.S.-brokered negotiations in Doha in September represented a dramatic escalation of its bid to reshape the Middle East by airpower. That was the kind of gambit undertaken only by leaders completely convinced of their immunity from the consequences of their actions. But Trump decided that this time, Israel had gone too far. The indelible image of a scowling Trump watching Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sheepishly read a scripted apology on a phone call to the emir of Qatar seems emblematic of the shifting geopolitical moment that led to the initial cease-fire in Gaza.
>It is unclear whether Trump’s irritation with Israel will produce meaningful changes beyond the cease-fire. Citing supposed Hamas attacks in the south of Gaza, the Israeli military has resumed bombarding parts of the territory this week. Israel would be far better served by stepping back from the brink and embracing the opportunity offered by the cease-fire to dial down its military adventurism and seek the kind of sustainable regional order that can be reached only through serious movement toward a Palestinian state. Protracted conflict has exposed Israel’s shortcomings: its missile defenses do not offer perfect security, its economy cannot sustain endless war, its domestic politics are convulsed after the long period of strife in Gaza, and its military remains deeply dependent on the United States. The devastation of Gaza has destroyed Israel’s standing in the world, leaving the country increasingly isolated and alone.
>Israel cannot bomb the Middle East into a stable new order. Regional leadership requires more than military primacy. It also demands some degree of consent and cooperation from other regional powers. But nobody in the Middle East wants Israeli leadership, and all states now increasingly fear its unchecked might. Some in Washington celebrate the prospect of an unrestrained Israel laying waste to U.S. adversaries. But they should be careful what they wish for. Israel’s interests are not the same as those of the United States—and Israel is writing a lot of checks that the United States might not be willing or able to cash.