In 2021, U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that Beijing had set a serious goal of controlling Taiwan before 2027. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then,” he warned. “And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.”
This prediction, which gained so much attention in Washington that it came to be known as the Davidson Window, quickly spurred action. Within the year, Congress authorized $7.1 billion for the newly created Pacific Deterrence Initiative, designed to boost the United States’ capability to deter Chinese military adventurism, and the policy community scrambled to develop strategies to counter Chinese military threats. The U.S. government offered so much diplomatic, political, economic, and security support to Taiwan that some veteran Taiwan watchers began to remind U.S. policymakers of the importance of reassuring China that the United States doesn’t support Taiwan independence.
In the past few years, however, many observers began to question the Davidson Window. They think China’s military is not ready for such a difficult operation—and for good reasons. An amphibious landing followed by an assault on a mountainous island like Taiwan would be operationally difficult. And China’s military is embroiled in rounds of purges that have ousted numerous senior generals. The costs and consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine, meanwhile, have demonstrated the difficulty of a takeover and the devastating result of sanctions. China has enough other priorities, the theory goes, that Taiwan is unlikely to be on the agenda today.
But what this theory misses is that the Chinese view on Taiwan changed significantly in 2025. In the past year, China has been highly vocal about the inevitability and indisputability of what it calls its “reunification” with Taiwan. Although skeptics would say China has always made these claims, this time something is different: this time China believes it. The Chinese policy community is increasingly convinced that an effort to assert control of Taiwan will happen, and it could even be imminent if Taiwan does something to provoke Beijing. The fundamental driver of this new assessment is U.S. politics and the perception that U.S. President Donald Trump has little interest in defending Taiwan militarily. Augmenting it is Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s own tenacious pursuit of unification and the decline in popularity of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. In other words, China sees an opportunity that may not arise again down the road.
There are moments in history when multiple internal and external factors act jointly to promote a certain outcome—when “perfect storms” brew and the seemingly unimaginable starts to take hold. Given the current circumstances, such a perfect storm for Taiwan might be coming sooner than people think.
THE XI LEGACY
Although Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027, it is hard to imagine that China would take action that year. The Chinese Communist Party will have its 21st Party Congress in the fall of 2027, and in Chinese politics, the priority during any given party congress year is absolute stability. All decisions are evaluated first and foremost against whether they could cause even the slightest possibility of political uncertainty. The CCP is a fundamentally conservative organization, and any major decisions that could challenge the delicate balance of power within the party during a time of heightened intraparty politics would likely be postponed.
But 2027 is critical for another reason: it marks the end of Xi’s third term in charge. Discussions about the succession plan for Xi, who will be 74 years old at that time, have been quiet but ongoing. The dominant theory among observers is that Xi won’t hand over power all at once, but as early as 2027 he could give up one of the three top leadership roles: president (head of the government), general secretary of the party, and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He would then incrementally give up the others, with the option to suspend or abandon this process at any time.
Since 1949, the CCP leadership has made different decisions about succession regarding these three positions. Mao Zedong gave up the presidency in 1959 after being challenged within the party, but he retained the position of general secretary of the party and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. Deng Xiaoping gave up all three when he handed over power to Jiang Zemin in 1989, but he maintained unparalleled authority behind the scenes through the Central Advisory Commission, a consultative body composed of party elders. In 2002, Jiang Zemin gave up the presidency and relinquished his position as general secretary of the party but retained leadership of the military for another three years—well into Hu Jintao’s first term. And Hu gave up all three to Xi when he stepped down.
If a succession process begins soon, many observers predict Xi will give up the presidency first, as it has the least power of the three.Handing over any title, however, would jeopardize absolute consensus within the system. With power decentralized, any military plan to take over Taiwan would likely be postponed.
It is entirely possible that 2027 may come and go with Xi launching a fourth term fully in charge. Xi does not have to step aside, nor does he have to take control of Taiwan—it is not a defined key performance indicator for Xi, just as it was not for any of his predecessors. But Xi, more than any previous leader, has pushed harder for bringing Taiwan to heel. If Xi has a chance to achieve his goal of “reunification,” he is likely to take it.
Standard_Ad7704 on
SS:
* Despite skepticism regarding China’s military readiness and the “Davidson Window,” Beijing’s assessment shifted significantly in 2025, driven by a belief that a “perfect storm” of favorable conditions has made the forced reunification with Taiwan not only inevitable but potentially imminent.
* This strategic confidence stems primarily from the perception that the current U.S. administration promotes non-interventionism and prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, signaling to China a temporary, three-year window where Washington is unlikely to militarily defend Taiwan.
* Internal political factors further fuel this volatility, as Xi Jinping faces pressure to secure his legacy before a potential 2027 leadership transition, while the declining popularity of Taiwan’s ruling party offers Beijing hope that domestic morale in Taiwan is fracturing.
* While the People’s Liberation Army struggles with internal purges and leadership deficits, Beijing calculates that without direct U.S. intervention, it possesses overwhelming superiority over Taiwan’s forces and can successfully manage the economic consequences of international sanctions.
2 Comments
In 2021, U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that Beijing had set a serious goal of controlling Taiwan before 2027. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then,” he warned. “And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.”
This prediction, which gained so much attention in Washington that it came to be known as the Davidson Window, quickly spurred action. Within the year, Congress authorized $7.1 billion for the newly created Pacific Deterrence Initiative, designed to boost the United States’ capability to deter Chinese military adventurism, and the policy community scrambled to develop strategies to counter Chinese military threats. The U.S. government offered so much diplomatic, political, economic, and security support to Taiwan that some veteran Taiwan watchers began to remind U.S. policymakers of the importance of reassuring China that the United States doesn’t support Taiwan independence.
In the past few years, however, many observers began to question the Davidson Window. They think China’s military is not ready for such a difficult operation—and for good reasons. An amphibious landing followed by an assault on a mountainous island like Taiwan would be operationally difficult. And China’s military is embroiled in rounds of purges that have ousted numerous senior generals. The costs and consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine, meanwhile, have demonstrated the difficulty of a takeover and the devastating result of sanctions. China has enough other priorities, the theory goes, that Taiwan is unlikely to be on the agenda today.
But what this theory misses is that the Chinese view on Taiwan changed significantly in 2025. In the past year, China has been highly vocal about the inevitability and indisputability of what it calls its “reunification” with Taiwan. Although skeptics would say China has always made these claims, this time something is different: this time China believes it. The Chinese policy community is increasingly convinced that an effort to assert control of Taiwan will happen, and it could even be imminent if Taiwan does something to provoke Beijing. The fundamental driver of this new assessment is U.S. politics and the perception that U.S. President Donald Trump has little interest in defending Taiwan militarily. Augmenting it is Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s own tenacious pursuit of unification and the decline in popularity of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. In other words, China sees an opportunity that may not arise again down the road.
There are moments in history when multiple internal and external factors act jointly to promote a certain outcome—when “perfect storms” brew and the seemingly unimaginable starts to take hold. Given the current circumstances, such a perfect storm for Taiwan might be coming sooner than people think.
THE XI LEGACY
Although Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027, it is hard to imagine that China would take action that year. The Chinese Communist Party will have its 21st Party Congress in the fall of 2027, and in Chinese politics, the priority during any given party congress year is absolute stability. All decisions are evaluated first and foremost against whether they could cause even the slightest possibility of political uncertainty. The CCP is a fundamentally conservative organization, and any major decisions that could challenge the delicate balance of power within the party during a time of heightened intraparty politics would likely be postponed.
But 2027 is critical for another reason: it marks the end of Xi’s third term in charge. Discussions about the succession plan for Xi, who will be 74 years old at that time, have been quiet but ongoing. The dominant theory among observers is that Xi won’t hand over power all at once, but as early as 2027 he could give up one of the three top leadership roles: president (head of the government), general secretary of the party, and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He would then incrementally give up the others, with the option to suspend or abandon this process at any time.
Since 1949, the CCP leadership has made different decisions about succession regarding these three positions. Mao Zedong gave up the presidency in 1959 after being challenged within the party, but he retained the position of general secretary of the party and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. Deng Xiaoping gave up all three when he handed over power to Jiang Zemin in 1989, but he maintained unparalleled authority behind the scenes through the Central Advisory Commission, a consultative body composed of party elders. In 2002, Jiang Zemin gave up the presidency and relinquished his position as general secretary of the party but retained leadership of the military for another three years—well into Hu Jintao’s first term. And Hu gave up all three to Xi when he stepped down.
If a succession process begins soon, many observers predict Xi will give up the presidency first, as it has the least power of the three.Handing over any title, however, would jeopardize absolute consensus within the system. With power decentralized, any military plan to take over Taiwan would likely be postponed.
It is entirely possible that 2027 may come and go with Xi launching a fourth term fully in charge. Xi does not have to step aside, nor does he have to take control of Taiwan—it is not a defined key performance indicator for Xi, just as it was not for any of his predecessors. But Xi, more than any previous leader, has pushed harder for bringing Taiwan to heel. If Xi has a chance to achieve his goal of “reunification,” he is likely to take it.
SS:
* Despite skepticism regarding China’s military readiness and the “Davidson Window,” Beijing’s assessment shifted significantly in 2025, driven by a belief that a “perfect storm” of favorable conditions has made the forced reunification with Taiwan not only inevitable but potentially imminent.
* This strategic confidence stems primarily from the perception that the current U.S. administration promotes non-interventionism and prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, signaling to China a temporary, three-year window where Washington is unlikely to militarily defend Taiwan.
* Internal political factors further fuel this volatility, as Xi Jinping faces pressure to secure his legacy before a potential 2027 leadership transition, while the declining popularity of Taiwan’s ruling party offers Beijing hope that domestic morale in Taiwan is fracturing.
* While the People’s Liberation Army struggles with internal purges and leadership deficits, Beijing calculates that without direct U.S. intervention, it possesses overwhelming superiority over Taiwan’s forces and can successfully manage the economic consequences of international sanctions.