>[This ideological shift](https://www.chinatalk.media/p/longing-for-the-cultural-revolution) stems from an emerging group known as the “Net Left” (wang zuo, 网左), which is predominantly composed of — and popular among — students. The “Net Left” possesses neither a unified manifesto nor a cohesive organization; rather, it is a wave of public opinion that coalesced through a series of events. Because this group adheres to radical left-wing populist views but operates almost exclusively in digital spaces, never convening in person or organizing offline activities, the public dubbed them the “Net Left.” This moniker serves to distinguish them from the older, more academically established “New Left” (xin zuopai, 新左派) that was previously prominent in Chinese intellectual discourse.
>The tide turned in 2019, when the “996.ICU” movement, a protest launched by tech workers against relentless overtime schedules, re-energized radical left-wing voices in the public sphere. During this period, the language of Cultural Revolution nostalgia resurfaced in the Chinese digital world. Alibaba founder Jack Ma, once affectionately nicknamed “Daddy Ma” (马爸爸), was suddenly rebranded as a “capitalist” who deserved to be “strung up from lamp posts” (挂路灯), a nod to the French Revolutionary cry “À la lanterne!” This sentiment was further fueled by a series of financial scandals involving entertainment celebrities. Most notably, the alleged insider trading scandal of idol actress Vicki Zhao (赵薇) pushed more people into the ranks of the anti-capitalist radical left.
>During this era, the burgeoning movement abandoned the dense jargon of European postmodernism. Instead, it distilled its discourse into a binary struggle: the “compradors” (买办) and “capital” (资本) versus the “exploitation” (剥削) of “the people”. This simplified narrative attracted a massive influx of young people who were frustrated with their poverty and pressure but struggled to find an answer. Suddenly, the solution was no longer buried in thousands of pages of Deleuzian tomes. Everything was reduced to a single, omnipotent, and evil symbol: “capital.” This shift represented the instrumentalization of theory as a weapon. Realizing that complex European philosophy could not directly address the injustices of their reality, these young people stripped away the philosophical nuance, leaving behind only the most radical forms of struggle.
>The final catalyst that solidified the self-identification of these radical left followers was the massive public debate surrounding the term “small-town test-takers” (xiaozhen zuotijia, 小镇做题家) in May 2020. This group consisted of elite university graduates coming from China’s third- and fourth-tier cities or rural areas who found themselves utterly unable to compete with their peers from developed regions in the job market. They mocked themselves as people from small towns who were good at nothing but taking tests, lacking the necessary social capital to succeed. Consequently, they felt they had rapidly degenerated into “losers” upon leaving the ivory tower (given the fact that youth unemployment rate in China is 16.9%). As the online discussion ignited, the scope of this concept expanded; many current students still inside the examination hamster wheel began to identify with this label, gradually transforming their self-mockery into collective anger.
today in “everything everywhere is the same” studies: china has chapo leftists now
Maximilianne on
Ehh, from a pure Machiavelli sense,the CCP, have the structural advantage,namely internet censorship to prevent organizing and given they have massively overbuilt housing, they can always just resettle them around the country to prevent them from clustering
MethyleneBlueEnjoyer on
>The final catalyst that solidified the self-identification of these radical left followers was the massive public debate surrounding the term “small-town test-takers” (xiaozhen zuotijia, 小镇做题家) in May 2020. This group consisted of elite university graduates coming from China’s third- and fourth-tier cities or rural areas who found themselves utterly unable to compete with their peers from developed regions in the job market. They mocked themselves as people from small towns who were good at nothing but taking tests, lacking the necessary social capital to succeed. Consequently, they felt they had rapidly degenerated into “losers” upon leaving the ivory tower (given the fact that youth unemployment rate in China is 16.9%).
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>[This ideological shift](https://www.chinatalk.media/p/longing-for-the-cultural-revolution) stems from an emerging group known as the “Net Left” (wang zuo, 网左), which is predominantly composed of — and popular among — students. The “Net Left” possesses neither a unified manifesto nor a cohesive organization; rather, it is a wave of public opinion that coalesced through a series of events. Because this group adheres to radical left-wing populist views but operates almost exclusively in digital spaces, never convening in person or organizing offline activities, the public dubbed them the “Net Left.” This moniker serves to distinguish them from the older, more academically established “New Left” (xin zuopai, 新左派) that was previously prominent in Chinese intellectual discourse.
>The tide turned in 2019, when the “996.ICU” movement, a protest launched by tech workers against relentless overtime schedules, re-energized radical left-wing voices in the public sphere. During this period, the language of Cultural Revolution nostalgia resurfaced in the Chinese digital world. Alibaba founder Jack Ma, once affectionately nicknamed “Daddy Ma” (马爸爸), was suddenly rebranded as a “capitalist” who deserved to be “strung up from lamp posts” (挂路灯), a nod to the French Revolutionary cry “À la lanterne!” This sentiment was further fueled by a series of financial scandals involving entertainment celebrities. Most notably, the alleged insider trading scandal of idol actress Vicki Zhao (赵薇) pushed more people into the ranks of the anti-capitalist radical left.
>During this era, the burgeoning movement abandoned the dense jargon of European postmodernism. Instead, it distilled its discourse into a binary struggle: the “compradors” (买办) and “capital” (资本) versus the “exploitation” (剥削) of “the people”. This simplified narrative attracted a massive influx of young people who were frustrated with their poverty and pressure but struggled to find an answer. Suddenly, the solution was no longer buried in thousands of pages of Deleuzian tomes. Everything was reduced to a single, omnipotent, and evil symbol: “capital.” This shift represented the instrumentalization of theory as a weapon. Realizing that complex European philosophy could not directly address the injustices of their reality, these young people stripped away the philosophical nuance, leaving behind only the most radical forms of struggle.
>The final catalyst that solidified the self-identification of these radical left followers was the massive public debate surrounding the term “small-town test-takers” (xiaozhen zuotijia, 小镇做题家) in May 2020. This group consisted of elite university graduates coming from China’s third- and fourth-tier cities or rural areas who found themselves utterly unable to compete with their peers from developed regions in the job market. They mocked themselves as people from small towns who were good at nothing but taking tests, lacking the necessary social capital to succeed. Consequently, they felt they had rapidly degenerated into “losers” upon leaving the ivory tower (given the fact that youth unemployment rate in China is 16.9%). As the online discussion ignited, the scope of this concept expanded; many current students still inside the examination hamster wheel began to identify with this label, gradually transforming their self-mockery into collective anger.
today in “everything everywhere is the same” studies: china has chapo leftists now
Ehh, from a pure Machiavelli sense,the CCP, have the structural advantage,namely internet censorship to prevent organizing and given they have massively overbuilt housing, they can always just resettle them around the country to prevent them from clustering
>The final catalyst that solidified the self-identification of these radical left followers was the massive public debate surrounding the term “small-town test-takers” (xiaozhen zuotijia, 小镇做题家) in May 2020. This group consisted of elite university graduates coming from China’s third- and fourth-tier cities or rural areas who found themselves utterly unable to compete with their peers from developed regions in the job market. They mocked themselves as people from small towns who were good at nothing but taking tests, lacking the necessary social capital to succeed. Consequently, they felt they had rapidly degenerated into “losers” upon leaving the ivory tower (given the fact that youth unemployment rate in China is 16.9%).
Sounds like something got over-produced here.