SS: An interesting summary of which regimes have actually fallen over the last hundred years, what researchers in that time figured out about doing predictive geopolitical analysis, and how those methods apply to Iran today. Taking some of these simple models to create some directional boundaries produces an 8% chance of collapse within the year, well below the imminent-collapse talk we've been hearing. I hope the policymakers who bet on regime change understood this going in.
Posted by Subject-City-1353
6 Comments
It’s less than that unfortunately.
And even if it falls, it is a big assumption a better government may come out of it instead of a bigger, inquisitive and repressive monster like the hardline remnants of the IRGC.
The war made the end of the IR much less likely, not more. To wit, the war:
* Cleared the field of aging, longstanding leadership, allowing the IRGC to completely consolidate control over the government behind a figurehead who might well be dead or incapacitated
* Created a rally-round-the-flag effect for moderates who may hate the IR, but still won’t turn coat when Iran is attacked, as well as delegitimizing the opposition in these people’s eyes
* Firmly roped the Artesh into the IRGC’s camp, eliminating any possibility of widespread defection (to the extent that there was any, anyways)
* Humiliated Reza Pahlavi, the most popular opposition figure in the diaspora, not inaccurately painting him as a puppet of foreign interests (something that, given the history of foreign meddling in Iran’s affairs starting all the way back in the Qajar dynasty, Iranians are *very* sensitive to)
* Gave the IR a huge legitimacy boost in the eyes of the international community, even countries historically on icy terms with Iran
* Suppressed protests through mass bombing campaigns, heavily demoralizing the in-country opposition
The protests were starting back up again in February. If there was a revolution brewing in Iran, Trump and Netanyahu killed it in the cradle.
So you’re saying there’s a chance
8%? Someone’s optimistic.
>The fundamental law of revolution confirmed by all revolutions, and particularly by all three Russian revolutions of the twentieth century, is as follows: It is not sufficient for the revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; for the revolution it is necessary that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule as of old. **Only when the masses** ***do not want*** **the old regime, and when the rulers** ***are unable*** **to govern as of old, then only can the revolution succeed.**
Vladimir Lenin.
As long as the regime is cohesive enough, within the short term it is unlikely to fall
The main factor would be: could the IRGC ascendancy rally the elites around itself without an immediate conflict, generate enough income to distribute through the elites, and whether the spiritual legitimacy will persist given the power has switched from the clerics to security apparatus?
North Korea is a proof you can persist through anything if the regime is coherent enough. Though they are very good at preventing protests from even happening in the first place.